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The news of America’s housing crisis, and the implosion of the sub-prime 
mortgage lending industry has spread throughout the globe. Still, little is known 
even amongst Americans about where foreclosures themselves are concentrated,  
or the degree to which foreclosed properties are being left vacant and 
succumbing to decay. Focusing on Philadelphia, this research combines Sheriff’s 
Department data on foreclosed properties with property title searches and 
demographic data to construct a precise demographic description of the 
neighborhoods where foreclosure occurs most abundantly. Common amongst 
these communities is the predominance of African Americans, accompanied by 
sizeable minority populations of Whites and moderately strong property values 
between $50,000 and $90,000. While few foreclosed properties are succumbing to 
abandonment within these communities, thousands are being left vacant for short 
term periods of nine to ten months. Meanwhile,  adjustable rate mortgages 
continue to reset in greater numbers, and property values in Philadelphia are 
beginning to fall. If decisive action is not taken to encourage residents to 
purchase and occupy foreclosed properties, much of the housing stock within 
these neighborhoods is at risk of deterioration. 
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Preface 
A few months ago, I had the pleasure and privilege to meet Martin Eakes, CEO 
and Founder of Self-Help Credit Union and the Center for Responsible Lending. Mr. 
Eakes had come to the University of Pennsylvania to speak about his experiences 
building a successful non-profit credit union in North Carolina, which he and his 
colleagues established to help disadvantaged communities build wealth through home 
and small business ownership. Coincidently, this lecture took place during the crash of 
the American housing market in the Fall of 2007. That semester, newspaper headlines 
and nightly news hours were riddled with grim explanations of how the collapse of sub-
prime mortgage loans in the U.S. brought massive financial losses to some of the world’s 
most powerful banking and lending institutions. These banks had taken on the challenge 
of extending homeownership to low-wealth communities while subsequently trying to 
turn a profit. In doing so, they failed. But sitting in front of us Mr. Eakes stood as a 
symbol of hope and righteousness. Here was a true entrepreneur, confident, calm, and 
collected. A man who had made a business out of lending to low-income communities 
with blemished credit histories, a feat even the world’s most powerful banks had failed to 
accomplish. But not only had Mr. Eake’s business survived, it continues to achieve 
tremendous success. 
Mortgage lending offers families the opportunity to build capital they would not 
otherwise be able to attain. However, if practiced recklessly, it can devastate entire 
neighborhoods and cripple our nation’s economy. Businesses such as Mr. Eakes’ 
understand the obstacles to homeownership, and serve their clients with sincere concern 
and compassion. In doing so, they help to cultivate a new wave of entrepreneurs, 
 5 
investors, and visionaries, which strengthens our economy and advances the cause of 
economic justice. This research is meant to contribute to an understanding of how 
contemporary mortgage lending practices affect our communities, in order to help leaders 
like Mr. Eakes achieve their goals.
 6 
Introduction 
 The first decade of the 21
st
 century has been an important period in the history of 
homeownership in America. In the fourth quarter of 2004, the number of homeowner-
occupied houses reached a record high, at 69 percent of all residential units nationwide.
1
 
Concurrently, the national rate of foreclosure (the percentage of home-owning families to 
fall behind on their mortgage payments and be subsequently evicted from their homes) 
has also risen to record heights. In the third quarter of 2007, the Mortgage Bankers 
Association’s National Delinquency Report revealed the highest rate of foreclosure ever 
recorded in the survey’s history of 55 years. 2 
Many would argue that the rise in foreclosures should not come as a surprise. As 
the market for homeownership extends to populations previously underserved, and 
families confront the responsibility of homeownership for the first time, one might 
naturally expect foreclosures to rise. In Pennsylvania however, data on mortgage 
delinquency suggests that “growing foreclosure filings do not appear to be simply the 
result of an expanding mortgage market, as filings are outpacing any gains in 
homeownership”.3 Furthermore, while the nation-wide rate of homeownership dropped 
below its peak after 2004, the rate of foreclosure continues to grow. 
By examining the foreclosure crisis in detail I will provide insight into the 
workings of the market for urban homeownership. Specifically, I will identify the 
neighborhoods in Philadelphia that experience the highest rates of mortgage foreclosure 
and discover demographics that are common amongst these areas. In addition, I will 
determine how foreclosure rates differ throughout the city, and explain the extent to 
                                                 
1 United States Department of Commerce, 5 
2 Aversa, 1 
3 TRF, 34 
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which foreclosed properties are being left vacant and subject to decay. In doing so, I will 
identify regions of the city where mortgage lending practices threaten overall community 
stability. Finally, I will explain the causes of these lending market inefficiencies and 
propose models for change.  
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Literature Review 
 
In the most simple terms, a rise in foreclosures signals that an increasing number 
of Americans have over-extended themselves financially in hopes of achieving the goal 
of homeownership. Given that this population now represents a record number of 
Americans
4
, which has grown steadily for at least the past 25 years
5
, it seems an 
appropriate time to pose questions such as: What has prior research shown to be the 
societal benefits of homeownership? And, does homeownership also create unwanted 
social costs? Only after thoroughly assessing the benefits and harms of homeownership to 
our social and economic environment can we begin to view the recent rise in foreclosures 
in an appropriate light. 
Perhaps the most widely accepted benefit of homeownership is the role it plays in 
community building. Many argue that homeownership provides an incentive for residents 
to take a more active role in the upkeep of their neighborhoods. For example, if a 
homeowner sits idly by while a neighboring lot succumbs to drug dealing or other 
criminal activity, that owner risks a substantial depreciation in the value of their home.  
Furthermore, the longer a homebuyer resides within their property, the greater financial 
benefits they will accrue as they gradually pay off the principal of their mortgage loan. 
Unless property values in the neighborhood are rapidly falling, there is a financial 
incentive for owners to remain in their home for years. If a homeowner knows they will 
be living in a particular neighborhood for some time, they may be more likely to become 
involved in neighborhood activities as they themselves stand to benefit directly from 
long-term goals of community development. In addition, the longer residents remain 
                                                 
4 Reuters, 1 
5 TRF, 7 
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within certain neighborhoods, the more closely connected they become with their 
neighbors and the more easily they are able to draw upon the resources within their 
communities. 
Surprisingly, these assumptions remain largely untested. In 1996 Rossi and Weber 
employed nation-wide survey methods to discover that while owners were actually less 
likely to form close social ties with their neighbors than renters, they were more likely to 
be members and leaders of community improvement groups.
6
 While these results seem to 
confirm the existence of a community-building effect of homeownership, we must 
examine the finding from a critical perspective. Rossi and Weber’s research only 
establishes a link, not a causal relationship. We know that homeowners themselves are 
more active in community organizations than renters are, but we cannot say with 
certainty that this increased civic participation is in any way a direct result of 
homeownership. Furthermore, the concept of what does and does not constitute effective 
community building is surely subject to socioeconomic biases. 
Another widely held assumption is that homeownership provides a more stable 
living environment for families and their children. This added stability presumably grants 
children a head start in happiness, educational attainment, and financial success. In 1996, 
Green and White used linear regression models to measure the association between 
parental homeownership and educational attainment amongst children. The researchers 
applied this model to three comprehensive data sets and found that across all three sets, 
parental homeownership was a “statistically significant and economically important 
determinant of whether their children stay[ed] in school.”7 In order to identify causal 
                                                 
6 Rossi & Weber, 29 
7 Green & White, 452 
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relationships rather than simply associations, the study controlled for the effects of a 
number of important variables. For example, some might say that home-owning parents 
are generally wealthier than parents who rent. Therefore, children of home-owning 
parents stay in school longer, but only because their parents can more easily afford to 
support their children’s continuing education. In order to counter such biases, this study 
controlled for a number of variables that measured the stability of the home environment 
as well as neighborhood quality and parental income. Even under such controls, the 
researchers’ findings held.8  
While literature assessing the linkage between homeownership, community 
building, and educational outcomes are sparse, sources abound which attest to the 
financial benefits of homeownership for both the individual and the broader economy. 
When real estate values rise, homeowners have greater access to capital through home 
sales and increased access to home equity borrowing. Between 2001 and 2003 for 
example, one quarter of the surging growth in consumer spending originated from 
housing- related effects.
9
 According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard 
University:  
 
Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan has rightly credited 
housing wealth, realized capital gains, and home equity borrowing with shoring 
up the economy in the aftermath of the stock market collapse of 2000 and the 
recession of 2001, primarily through their effects on consumer spending.
10
 
 
                                                 
8 Green & White, 453 
9 Belsky & Prakken, 1 
10 Belsky & Prakken, 1 
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For many, the home can serve as an excellent means of collateral for securing loans.  
When real estate values rise or are expected to rise, homeowners borrow capital based on 
the expected future value of their homes. This allows households to spend cash they 
would not otherwise be able to attain. Altogether the process of extracting capital from 
housing appreciation augments our ability to consume, supports business activity and 
helps to feed America’s continuing economic growth.  
 Nevertheless, what happens when real estate values simply remain steady or fall? 
Even strong critics of homeownership cannot deny that on average property values have 
gradually appreciated over the course of American history. Still, this does not mean that a 
significant portion of properties have failed to appreciate in value over time. Edel, Sclar, 
and Luria’s detailed analysis of changes in property values in Boston during the Post 
World War II Era reveals that while overall property values increased during the 1950s 
and 1960s, housing values actually fell in many neighborhoods during this period when 
measured against inflation.
11
 In effect, rapid increases in home values in certain 
neighborhoods such as Boston’s Charlestown and North End offset declining or stagnant 
values in a number of other neighborhoods such as Roxbury, Dorchester, Jamaica Plain, 
and South Boston.
12
 By examining historical indices of real estate sale values in the city 
of Boston from 1890 to 1970, Edel Sclar and Luria contend that through homeownership: 
 
The majority of workers, building up equity over time, have kept the savings they 
have made out of their earned incomes, but they have not made enough on their 
                                                 
11 Edel, Schlar, & Luria, 88 
12 Edel, Schlar, & Luria, 89 
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real estate to divert money from capital gains on their homes to other investments. 
A substantial number have actually lost money on their houses.
13
 
 
A nationwide study by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
measuring appreciation of housing values between 1990 and 2000 seems to contradict 
Edel, Schlar, and Luria’s claim. In its study, HUD concludes that annual housing-related 
wealth accumulation amounted to $4,460 for high-income white households and $1,712 
for low-income minority families during that decade.
14
 On average, it finds that most 
homeowners are reaping financial returns on their investments. However, it is important 
to note that HUD’s report only covers the 1990s. Given that housing prices are cyclical, 
the findings of any such research depend largely on the time span examined in the study. 
During the early 1990s, there was an economic recession and a real estate market crash. 
Therefore, homes purchased during this time were likely bought at unusually low prices. 
Throughout the later half of the decade home prices rose steadily. It seems natural then 
that by measuring accumulation of housing wealth only throughout the 1990’s, HUD is 
able to produce findings that place low-income homeownership in a favorable light. 
Interestingly, HUD’s report also concludes that few minority households within their 
study advanced from first time homeownership into more valuable properties.
15
 These 
results seem to support Edel, Sclar, and Luria’s claim that working-class homeowners are 
only able to regain their savings through homeownership, while unable to leverage the 
capital necessary to achieve dramatic social mobility. 
                                                 
13 Edel, Schlar, & Luria, 24 
14 Boeh, Schlottmann, & ABT Associates Inc., 6 
15 Boehm, Schlottmann, & ABT Associates Inc., 6 
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To summarize, while the community-building effect of homeownership seems 
apparent, it is not clearly proven.  We know more definitively that when parents own 
homes, their children are more likely to attain higher levels of education regardless of 
race or income.  Homeownership facilitates substantial wealth accumulation for middle 
and high-income households, but whether it brings about wealth accumulation or 
leverages investment capital for low-income families is a matter for debate. Still, at 
minimum, homeownership allows working class families to retain income that would 
otherwise be allocated towards rent. There is no other form investment in America that 
allows one to save money that simultaneously covers the cost housing.  In this light, it 
does not seem surprising that a strong majority of Americans prefer owning rather than 
renting.
16
 Rising foreclosure rates signal that an increasing number of individuals are 
losing out in their attempts to reap these benefits associated with the ownership of real 
property. However, the social cost generated by rising foreclosure rates are borne not 
only by delinquent mortgagors, but by an expansive list of other stakeholders, all effected 
by the mortgagors potential failure or success.  
 Perhaps the most visible effect of foreclosures is urban blight. After defaulting on 
mortgage payments, borrowers may remain in their properties for months before eviction 
can lawfully be carried out. During this time, many borrowers do not adequately maintain 
their properties. This can occur simply because the occupant is facing financial 
difficulties and is unable to finance home repair, or because they have little incentive for 
upkeep, knowing that they will not remain in the home for long. Further damage to 
properties may also occur after their owners have been evicted, as “many foreclosed 
properties become vacant and abandoned…acting as magnets for crime, violence, and 
                                                 
16 Rossi & Weber, 4 
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other social ills.”17 The presence of these foreclosed properties causes blocks or 
neighborhoods to become less desirable places to live, which then translates into lower 
local property values. A Chicago-based study examining the impact of single-family 
mortgage foreclosures on property values asserts: 
 
Our most conservative estimates indicate that each conventional foreclosure 
within an eighth of a mile of a single-family home results in a decline of 0.9 
percent in value. Cumulatively, this means that, for the entire city of Chicago, the 
3,750 foreclosures that occurred in 1997 and 1998 are estimated to have reduced 
nearby property values by more than $598 million, for an average of $159,000 per 
foreclosure.
18
  
 
In a cyclone effect, falling property values then further reinforce rising numbers of 
foreclosure, as borrowers lose incentive to pay off loans worth more than the depreciating 
value of their homes. It is also important to note that the Chicago study does not examine 
the impact of foreclosure on nearby multifamily housing units, or commercial properties, 
whose values would likely decline as well. When abandoned housing clusters in certain 
areas, local businesses for example lose much-needed customers, and face difficulties 
attracting customers if nearby blighted properties host criminal activity.  
 Foreclosures also pose a significant burden on cities through costs imposed on 
municipal governments. In a report titled The Municipal Cost of Foreclosures: A Chicago 
Case Study, the Homeownership Preservation Foundation attempts to tally these costs, 
                                                 
17 Apgar, Duda, & Gorey, 3 
18 Immergluck & Smith, 1 
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generating an expansive list. According to the report, direct costs to city governments 
arise from: 
 
Increased policing; increased burden on fire departments (due to vandalism and/or 
arson); demolition costs; building inspections; legal expenses; costs associated 
with managing the foreclosure process or resulting from it (e.g., record 
keeping/updating); and increased demand for city social service programs.
19
 
 
The study finds that in Chicago, a single foreclosure could cost the City Government up 
to $6,753 
20
, even when no demolition or maintenance of the property is required. These 
high costs are primarily generated through servicing and legal fees. In addition, 
foreclosures deplete municipal tax revenues as residents facing foreclosure often become 
delinquent on property taxes. The declining real estate values associated with foreclosure 
further reduce revenues from real estate taxes because these taxes are derived from 
percentages of the overall values of individual properties. 
The degree to which mortgage default affects mortgage lenders depends on trends 
in property value at the time and place of foreclosure. The New York Times claims, 
“some industry analysts say it costs a bank an average of $40,000 to foreclose on a 
loan.”21 However, using the example of a $50,000 mortgage on a home now worth 
$80,000, White explains that rising property values often offset losses to lenders.
22
  If the 
home can be sold at its new value of $80,000 after foreclosure, then the sale of this 
                                                 
19 Apgare, Duda, & Gorey, 10 
20 Apgare, Duda, & Gorey, 40 
21 Darlin, 1 
22 White, 507 
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property exceeds the losses incurred by the borrower’s default of the $50,000 mortgage 
loan. If however the value of the property has decreased since the origination of the 
mortgage, then the lender is more likely to face financial losses. Though property values 
have steadily risen in Philadelphia during the past 15 years, home prices have recently 
begun to drop and many of the city’s most active mortgage lenders such as Countrywide 
Financial, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo are all sensitive to the current rising levels of 
foreclosure in the nation.
23
 When loans administered by these lenders default in large 
numbers, banks charge higher interest rates on future mortgage loans to all borrowers in 
order to cover their financial losses.  
Recently, the costs of foreclosures have extended all the way to European 
investment banks. The securitization of the mortgage industry which began in the 1970s 
allows lenders to bundle mortgage loans, and sell them to profit seeking individuals and 
institutions as investments. In July of 2007, the United Bank of Switzerland announced 
massive layoffs that included CEO Peter Wuffli. The Bank’s officials cited $124 million 
in losses from costly investments in collapsing sub-prime mortgages in the U.S. as the 
primary reason for the firings.
24
 
Though Wuffli may have lost his jobs as a result of failed high-risk lending 
strategies, it is unlikely that he will ever find himself living in a neighborhood where 
entire blocks succumb to blight as neighbors are evicted from their homes one by one.  It 
is the communities in which foreclosures occur that bear the overwhelming majority of 
the social cost brought on by the rise in mortgage delinquency. In 2005, Michael Powell 
                                                 
23 CNN Money.com, 1 
24 CNN Money.com, 1 
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of the Washington Post observed the following affect of the rise in foreclosures upon a 
residential block in Philadelphia:  
 
To walk Thayer Street in northeast Philadelphia is to count, door by door, the 
economic devastation afflicting a working-class neighborhood. On a single block, 
18 of the 42 brick row houses have gone into foreclosure in the past three years… 
Philadelphia, its suburbs and indeed much of Pennsylvania have experienced a 
foreclosure epidemic as low-income homeowners take on mortgage debt they 
cannot afford. In 2000, the Philadelphia sheriff auctioned 300 to 400 foreclosed 
properties a month; now he handles more than 1,000 a month.
25
 
 
But should Thayer street be considered an anomaly, or are other blocks throughout the 
city suffering similar outcomes? Without a more precise description of the location and 
characteristics of these devastated neighborhoods, along with an understanding of their 
abundance, we can never fully comprehend the effect of the rise in foreclosures on the 
nation. Fortunately, prior research offers some insight into both the causes of foreclosure, 
and the characteristics of communities where foreclosure occurs most abundantly.  
Historically, income and unemployment have been cited as the primary cause of 
mortgage delinquency in the America. In 1965, Beyer’s study Housing and Society 
proclaimed: “among the defaults and foreclosures that have occurred, the primary causes 
have been curtailment of income principally as a result of job layoffs, cuts in work week 
or wages, and business loss or failure”.26 Lennon’s 1967 study The Causes of 
Foreclosure in the Current Market also concludes that unemployment “is probably the 
                                                 
25 Powell, 1 
26 Beyer, 165 
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single most important factor”27 involved in triggering mortgage foreclosures.  In recent 
years however, the rise of foreclosures in Philadelphia has been accompanied by only 
modest growth in unemployment.  In December of 1997, the rate of unemployment in 
Philadelphia was 3.9 percent, only .2  percent less than in December of 2006. 
Unemployment reached its’ height in Philadelphia in 2002 at about 5 percent, but even as 
unemployment began to decline foreclosures continued to rise.
28
   
The apparent weakening of the effect of unemployment upon foreclosures might 
be due to the recent expansion of America’s working poor, as employment becomes 
plentiful in sectors that offer wages barely sufficient to hoist working people above the 
line of poverty.
29
 The creation of the Homeowner’s Emergency Mortgage Assistance 
Program (HEMAP) in 1983 has also played a role in weakening the effects of 
unemployment upon mortgage foreclosures. HEMAP offers financial assistance to those 
who have fallen behind on their mortgage payments due to matters beyond their control 
such as layoffs, or involuntary reduction of working hours.  Still, one cannot rule out the 
contribution of unemployment to the recent rise in foreclosures in Philadelphia. Although 
joblessness has remained relatively constant in the city as a whole, it is possible that 
unemployment is affecting certain areas of the city disproportionately, and in the areas hit 
hardest by layoffs, one might find the highest rates of mortgage delinquency.  
 More recent research suggests that high unemployment and low income are no 
longer the primary predictors of foreclosure in America. In 2007, a study at Rutgers 
University examining the history and demographics of foreclosures in Newark, New 
Jersey found mortgage defaults to be concentrated in “stable” neighborhoods that 
                                                 
27 Lennon, 68 
28 US Department of Labor: http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/metro_nr.htm 
29 Armour, 1 
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historically, did not experience the high levels of disinvestments that ravaged many 
neighborhoods during the post-industrial era.
30
 Concurrently, The Reinvestment Fund’s 
study of rising foreclosures in Pennsylvania identifies the expansion of sub-prime 
mortgage lending as a primary cause of foreclosure in both Philadelphia,
31
 and in the 
nation.
32
 But what are sub-prime loans, and why might they be producing mortgage 
foreclosures in such large number? 
Sub-prime mortgages are loans available to borrowers who do not qualify for 
traditional prime mortgage products. The sub-prime market provides an alternative for 
prospective homeowners, whose incomes or credit scores are simply too low for them to 
be considered reliable borrowers by traditional mortgage lenders. Since these borrowers 
are viewed as less likely to repay their loans, they are charged higher interest rates to 
compensate for the added risk banks incur by lending to them. On a 30-year fixed rate 
mortgage, a prime borrower might be charged 6 percent interest, while a sub prime 
borrower would pay 10.5 percent. In September of 2006, Mark Warshal, Vice President 
of Fairway Consumer Discount Company (a local sub-prime mortgage lender) testified 
before the PA Department of Banking and explained: “we do not check credit scores, and 
we do not require proof of income. Our philosophy is that if a consumer is able to secure 
his loan with equity in his real estate, then that consumer should be able to use the equity 
in his property to borrow the money he needs”33. This philosophy explains in part why 
mortgage default may be concentrated in stable, middle class neighborhoods. Within 
these communities, real estate values are likely to be moderately high, and to climb 
                                                 
30 Newman, 18 
31 TRF, 30 
32 TRF, 71 
33 PA Department of Banking, 7 
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steadily over time. This would allow borrowers with less than perfect credit to obtain 
high-risk refinancing loans secured by nothing more than the expected future value of 
their homes. In poorer neighborhoods, borrowers might be cut off from the sub-prime 
market, due to lack of income, or lack of lender confidence in the expected future values 
of their real estate. 
From the perspective of a mortgage lender, sub-prime borrowers are by definition 
at a higher risk for mortgage default. If this theory holds true, we would expect to see 
higher rates of mortgage delinquency in neighborhoods were sub-prime lending is 
concentrated. In July 2007, the Philadelphia Inquirer analyzed data from the 
Homeowners Mortgage Disclosure Act and was able to map the concentration of sub-
prime lending throughout the city. The neighborhoods in Philadelphia with the highest 
percentage of sub-prime mortgage loans issued in 2005 were Kingsessing, West Oak 
Lane, and West Philadelphia Parkside, all largely middle-class African American 
communities with sub-prime lending rates over 50 percent.
34
 The concentration of sub-
prime loans within African American neighborhoods is unfortunately widespread. Many 
sources indicate that race may be the single most important factors in determining the 
quality of mortgage loans borrowers receive. Even high-income African Americans are 
almost twice as likely as low-income Whites to apply for a sub prime loan.
35
 
In the city as a whole 14,158 sub-prime mortgages were issued in 2005.
36
 This 
equated to 27.9 percent of all mortgages issued in Philadelphia during that year.
37
  If we 
follow the estimates of The Center For Responsible Lending, which projects that 1 in 5 of 
                                                 
34 Baseden & Duchneskie, 1 
35 Ross & Yinger, 24 
36 Baseden & Duchneskie, 1 
37Baseden & Duchneskie, 1 
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all sub-prime loans issued in 2005 and 2006 will end in foreclosure
38
, we can expect to 
see 2,800 (roughly 5.5 percent) of all loans issued in 2005 to foreclose. For a 
neighborhood such as West Oak Lane, foreclosure rates on all loans issued in 2005 would 
be higher than 10%. With such massive quantities of foreclosures, mortgages interest 
rates rising, and home sales in Philadelphia declining
39
, the stage seems set for a number 
of foreclosed properties to go unsold and remain vacant. By determining where 
foreclosures are concentrated in Philadelphia, and also where foreclosed properties are 
going unsold, we will be able to determine which neighborhoods if any, are at risks for 
becoming sites of widespread housing abandonment as the real estate market enters its 
recession. If government policy can design incentives, which attract homebuyers to these 
neighborhoods, there is tremendous potential for the city to save on future costs 
associated with maintaining and/or demolishing these residential properties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Schloemer, Li, Ernst, Keest, 3 
39 Knox, 1 
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Methodology 
Before measuring the determinants of foreclosure through its associated variables, 
it is necessary to formulate a variable that is measure for foreclosure itself. Using data 
from the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Department (the municipal body which oversees the sale 
of foreclosed properties), I have compiled a sample of all properties that were issued 
Affidavits Pursuant to Rule 3129 (notices to foreclose) in 2005. Appendix two contains a 
sample copy of one such notice. In total, roughly 6,600 notices were issued to properties 
in Philadelphia in 2005, informing their owners that the mortgage lender who had 
financed the purchase or refinancing of these properties now intended to foreclose. In 
other words, the owner of the property fell behind on their mortgage payments and as a 
result, the lender decided to exercise its right under the loan to take possession of the 
property and to sell it at public auction. This public sale is pursued because it offers the 
lender a chance to recover the financial losses brought on by the borrowers missed 
payments. Though I did not collect data from all 6,600 foreclosure notices, I have 
compiled a randomly selected sample of 660 foreclosure notices, roughly 10% of all 
those that were issued in Philadelphia during that year. From these notices, I recorded the 
name of the owner, the foreclosing lender, the addresses of the property, and finally the 
date that the foreclosure sale was scheduled to occur. 
A property cannot be considered foreclosed upon simply after its owner receives 
an Affividavit Pursuant to Rule 3129. In many cases, before the sale occurs the owner is 
able to negotiate with the lender to modify the terms of the loan so that eventually, it can 
be repaid. Even more frequently, the owner is able to sell the property before the 
foreclosure auction, and pay off the loan in full with the revenues collected from the sale.   
 23 
Using an online database, which compiles property information made available to the 
public through the Philadelphia Board of Revision of Taxes, I was able to examine the 
deed records of each property in the sample. These records allowed me to determine 
whether or not a property had been sold at foreclosure auction and if so, how long it took 
the foreclosing bank to find a buyer for the property.  
Using Geographic Information Systems, a software program used to combine data 
analysis and mapping, I was able to map the locations of all foreclosed properties in my 
sample. Next, I used the program to determine how many foreclosures had occurred in 
each census tract in Philadelphia, and within each neighborhood.
40
 This is the basis for 
the foreclosure variable. By dividing the number of properties that foreclosed in a given 
census tract by the number of owner occupied houses with that tract
41
, I derived a 
variable hereby referred to as the Foreclosure Index. This index measures relative rates at 
which owner-occupied houses are being foreclosed upon within geographical units. 
Using other variables available at the tract and neighborhood level, I was able to draw 
conclusions about the median income, racial composition, poverty rates, homeownership 
rates, and property values of neighborhoods with the highest foreclosure indices. Because 
I examined only a small fraction of foreclosures that occurred as a result of mortgage 
delinquency in 2005, the foreclosure index itself is not an accurate measure of the actual 
rate of foreclosure within a neighborhood. However the index is useful in comparing the 
rates of foreclosure of different geographic areas. 
                                                 
40 The 69 neighborhoods in this study are based on neighborhood boundaries developed by the Temple 
University’s Social Science Data Library. Neighborhood boundaries are co-terminus with US Census 2000 
Census Tracts and are based on information gathered from the Philadelphia Police Department, the 
Philadelphia Inquirer and historical research at Temple University 
41 The number of owner occupied houses within each tract and neighborhood are derived from the year 
2000 US Census. 
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Simply identifying associations between foreclosure indices and demographic 
variables at the neighborhood level would fall sort of a comprehensive analysis of the 
relationship between these variables. In order to examine the relationships between these 
variables (or lack thereof) more definitively, I used SPSS, a software program used for 
data analysis to measure bi-variate correlations between foreclosure indices among 
census tracts, and a number of other tract-level variables which I list below. 
● Percentage of Population African American or Hispanic (2000) 
● Percentage of Population African American (2000) 
● Percentage of Population Hispanic (2000) 
● Median Real Estate Sale Value (2005) 
● Median Income (2000) 
● Poverty Rate (2000) 
● Percentage of Population Allocating over 30% of Income Towards Housing (a    
   presumed measure of the affordability of housing, 2000)  
● Median Age of Housing Units (2000) 
Bi-variate correlations are simple statistical analyses used to measure the degree to which 
a pair of variables are associated with one another. When measuring bi-variate 
correlations, SPSS generates a decimal value known as a Pearson Correlation. Depending 
on absolute value of the Pearson Correlation one can determine the strength of the 
relationship between the variables based on the following scale
42
: 
Pearson Correlation = .10 to .29 or -.10 to .29 (small) 
Pearson Correlation = .30 to .49 or -.30 to -.49 (medium) 
 Pearson Correlation = .50 to 1.0 or -.50 to –1.0 (large) 
                                                 
42 Pallant, 126 
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By squaring the Pearson correlation I calculated the amount of shared variance between 
the two variables. For example, if the Pearson Correlation between Median Income and 
the Foreclosure Index is .60, this indicates that there is a strong association between 
Median Income and Rate of Foreclosure and that variations in Median Income explain 
36% of the variance present in foreclosure indexes.  
 In order to compare in greater depth the strength of each of the independent 
variables (Income, Median Age of Housing Units, etc) in predicting the value of the 
dependant variable (the Foreclosure Index), I also employed a multiple regression 
analysis. The difference between a bivariate correlation measurement and a multiple 
regression measurement is that in a multiple regression, all the independent variables (or 
predictors) are entered into the analysis simultaneously, allowing the researcher to test 
each independent variable’s predictive power over and above all other variables entered 
into the equation.
43
 After running a multiple regression, SPSS generates a significance 
coefficient for each independent variable. According to Pallant, if the regression reveals a 
significance value that is less than .05 for one of the independent variables, “then that 
variable is making a significant and unique contribution to the prediction of the 
dependant variable”.44 This type of analysis allowed me to test the associations of racial 
composition, income, etc, with foreclosure indices, while controlling for all independent 
variables at once. 
 Finally, in order to gain a better sense of the causes of foreclosure in Philadelphia, 
I conducted interviews with local homeownership counselors working in foreclosure 
prevention. These counselors were a valuable source of input, as they work daily with 
                                                 
43 Pallant, 141 
44 Pallant, 153 
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clients facing the threat of losing their homes. Often, these counselors act as 
intermediaries between delinquent borrowers and mortgage lenders, and are exposed to 
borrowers’ mortgage paperwork, as well as their financial statements. Two of the 
counselors I interviewed worked in neighborhoods that were determined by this study to 
have foreclosure rates amongst the highest in the city. 
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Data & Analysis 
 
 Of all 660 properties in the sample, 310 (47%) were foreclosed upon and sold at 
the Sheriff’s Sale Auction, 79 (12%) were sold by their delinquent owners before the 
Sheriff’s Sale occurred, and 274 (41%) were neither sold by their owners, nor sold at the 
Sheriff’s Sale. Many of these 274 properties may still be foreclosed upon in the coming 
years as their owners may have been able to stall the foreclosure proceedings, or could 
have refinanced into even costlier loans whose interest rates have not yet reached their 
peak. In some cases, the owners of these properties may have negotiated more affordable 
repayment terms with their mortgage lender.  
 After using a bivariate correlation analysis to examine the relationships between 
the foreclosure indexes of all Philadelphia census tracts, and the demographic variables 
listed in the methodology section, I found only moderate to weak correlations within the 
data. Most notably, variables related to racial composition such as percentage African 
American and Hispanic, and percentage African American alone bear the strongest 
correlations to census tract foreclosure indexes. There is a moderate degree of common 
variance, which suggest that the higher the combine percentage of African Americans 
and Hispanics, or the higher the percentage of African Americans alone within a census 
tract, the higher that tract’s rate of foreclosure. Real Estate values bear a degree of 
association with foreclosure indexes as well, almost as strong as that of the percentage 
African American variable, but in the opposite direction. Low real estate values are 
moderately associated with high rates of foreclosure. Variables such as Income, Poverty 
Rates, percentage of Population Paying Over 30 percent of Income Towards Housing, 
and Mean Age of Housing Units all reveal weak correlations to the dependent variable. 
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Bivariate Correlation Analysis (Table 1) 
 
Variable 
Pearson 
Correlation To  
Foreclosure 
Indexes 
% of Variance in Rates of 
Foreclosure explained by this 
variable  
% African American and Hispanic 0.368 13.5% 
% African American 0.338 11.4% 
Median Real Estate Sale Value -0.333 11.1% 
Income -0.252 6.4% 
Poverty 0.235 5.5% 
% Population Allocating Over 30% of Income 
Towards Housing 0.22 4.8% 
Median Age of Housing Unit 0.2 4.0% 
% Hispanic 0.07 0.5% 
(According to Cohen (1988) Pearson Correlations with absolute values between .1 and .29 indicate small 
relationships between variables, absolute values between .30 and 4.9 indicate medium relationships, while 
absolute values between .50 and 1 indicate large relationships) 45 
 
 
The results of the multiple regression analysis confirm those of the Bivariate 
Correlation, demonstrating that when we control for all the independent variables listed 
in Table 1, the only variables that make a unique and significant contribution towards 
predicting a census tract’s Rate of Foreclosure are the percentage of African Americans, 
and the Median Real Estate Sale value within that tract (see Table 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Pallant, 126 
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Multiple Regression Analysis (Table 2) 
 
Variable 
Significance in Predicting Rate of 
Foreclosure 
% African American 0.000 
Median Real Estate Sale Value 0.012 
% Population Allocating over 30% of Income 
Towards Housing 0.093 
% Hispanic 0.231 
Median Age of Housing Unit 0.281 
Median Income 0.475 
Poverty 0.995 
 
(According to Pallant (2005), if the significance value is less than .05, then the independent 
variable is making a unique and significant contribution to the prediction of the dependant 
variable (rate of foreclosure in this case)).46 
 
 
The weak correlation between foreclosure and poverty rates suggests that 
foreclosures do not occur most abundantly in areas with high concentrations of poverty. 
Map 1 confirms this assumption, demonstrating that while foreclosures do occur in some 
of the poorest regions of Philadelphia, they are not most heavily concentrated in these 
areas. In fact, many regions of the city with high concentrations of poverty are devoid of 
any foreclosed properties within the sample.  One might assume that the lack of 
foreclosures within these neighborhoods is a result of lower rates of homeownership in 
impoverished communities. However, the collective homeownership rate of all tracts 
deemed areas of concentrated poverty is 53 percent, not far below the city-wide rate of 59 
percent. 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Pallant, 153 
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Map 1 
  
 31 
 
The significance of racial composition and real estate values in determining 
neighborhood rates of foreclosure becomes apparent upon both statistical and 
cartographic examinations of the data. Map 2 demonstrates that neighborhoods with 
property values between $30,000 and $100,000 contain virtually all foreclosed properties 
within the sample. While tracts within this range of median property values constitute 
only about 37% of all the owner-occupied housing units in Philadelphia, 86% of all 
foreclosures within the sample occurred either inside, or within ¼ mile of these tracts. 
Predominately African American tracts within this range of real estate values contain the 
highest number of foreclosed property relative to owner-occupied houses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
Map 2 
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Table 3 
Neighborhoods with the Highest Foreclosure Index in Philadelphia (2005) 
 
Neighborhood 
Foreclosure 
Index 
Foreclosure 
Index in Relation 
to City-Wide 
Foreclosure 
Index 
African 
American 
(%) 
Hispanic 
(%) 
White 
(%) 
Poverty 
Rate 
(%) 
Owner 
Occupied 
Houses 
(%) 
Median 
Income 
($) 
Median 
Monthly 
Mortgage 
Payment 
($) 
Median 
Real 
Estate 
Sale 
Value 
2005 ($) 
Elmwood 0.00455878 6.0 55.4 2.3 31.2 29.5 65.5 24,817 638 55,000 
Harrowgate 0.00340136 4.5 23.4 53.5 34.0 49.2 59.8 16,625 469 29,000 
East 
Germantown 0.00277932 3.7 92.0 1.3 4.9 28.0 58.1 24,804 731 52,998 
Olney 0.0019187 2.5 85.4 1.7 11.4 22.8 62.1 30,616 688 70,000 
Juniata Park 0.00184032 2.4 18.9 40.1 41.8 27.9 71.8 26,122 641 68,000 
Germantown 0.00182244 2.4 79.4 1.9 15.8 22.0 36.3 25,559 892 80,000 
West Oak Lane 0.00178708 2.4 49.9 2.1 44.3 8.2 57.2 37,714 780 82,000 
Kingsessing 0.00173681 2.3 95.3 1.1 1.8 30.3 63.7 23,050 656 29,275 
Ogontz 0.00172456 2.3 93.8 2.1 3.1 44.2 42.1 23,976 724 56,700 
Overbrook 0.00161772 2.1 44.6 21.0 21.1 21.2 70.4 32,530 793 87,900 
CITY WIDE 0.00086948 - 43.2 8.5 45.0 22.2 59.3 30,746 800 86,000 
 
 Above I list the ten neighborhoods of Philadelphia which scored the highest on the foreclosure index. Below are important 
point to notes regarding the common demographic of the neighborhoods: 
● 8 of these 10 neighborhoods are predominately African American, but 7 are at least 20% White.  
● All but one of these neighborhoods have Owner Occupancy Rates above the City-Wide mean. 
● 8 out of 10 have Median Real Estate Sale Values between $50,000 and $90,000 
● 8 out of 10 have Median Incomes between $23,000 and $33,000 
● 7 out of 10 have Poverty Rates between 21% and 31% 
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Map 3 
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Map 4 
Foreclosure Counts Within Philadelphia Neighborhoods (2005) 
 
 
 
Elmwood (28) 
West Oak Lane (21) 
Harrowgate (10) 
Map 4 demonstrates the disparities in foreclosure 
counts between neighborhoods of Philadelphia. 
Given that only 10% of all foreclosure notices 
issued in 2005 were examined in this study, I 
assume that 280 properties were foreclosed upon  
in Elmwood as a result of mortgage delinquency 
in 2005, 210 in West Oak Lane, and 100 in 
Harrowgate. 
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Assuming an accurate sample, it appears that roughly 1 out of every 110 owner-
occupied homes in Philadelphia was foreclosed upon as a result of mortgage delinquency 
which occurred in 2005. In Elmwood, (the neighborhood which scored highest on the 
foreclosure index) roughly 1 in 20 owner occupied homes faced foreclosure as a result of 
delinquency occurring in 2005. Foreclosure rates within the neighborhoods scoring 
highest on the foreclosure index range anywhere from two to five times the city-wide rate 
With few exceptions, these neighborhoods are predominately African American, with 
sizable White populations between 10 and 44 percent, and real estate sale values between 
$50,000 and $90,000. As Map 1 demonstrates, high-foreclosure areas constitute a middle 
ground between regions of concentrated wealth and those of concentrated poverty. The 
decay of these communities would likely bring about striking changes in the socio-
economic structure of the city as a whole. 
With respect to vacancies, 91 of the 310 foreclosed properties within the sample 
went unsold by their foreclosing lender for 6 months or more. On average, each of these 
91 properties went unsold to prospective owners for 9.5 months. Therefore, I infer that as 
a result of mortgage delinquency in 2005, approximately 910 foreclosed properties were 
left vacant for 9.5 months in the years that followed. Map 5 shows that these unsold 
properties were disproportionately clustered in areas with high rates of foreclosure. In 
fact, foreclosed properties seem to lie vacant only in areas with high concentrations of 
foreclosure. No foreclosed properties which stood alone as the only foreclosed properties 
in their neighborhoods remained unsold for over 6 months. This suggests that in high 
foreclosure neighborhoods in particular, the demand for housing  is not strong enough to 
absorb the number of properties being reintroduced to the market as a result of 
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foreclosure and eviction. Still, only 17 of the properties left unsold for 6 months or more 
remained unsold as of November 2007. While almost 1,000 properties remained vacant 
for short term periods of roughly 9.5 months, very few were never purchased by new 
owners. 
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     Map 5 
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In order to better comprehend the causes of foreclosure with high-foreclosure 
communities, I conducted 3 interviews with foreclosure prevention counselors working in 
Center City, Germantown, and West Oak Lane. After asking these professionals what 
they believed to be the primary cause of foreclosure within the communities they served, 
the counselors gave the following responses: 
 
“I would say some of the tops causes [of foreclosure] are….sub-prime lending, I think is 
a big one, and that’s not necessarily predatory lending but one of the top reasons for 
people falling behind with sub-prime loans or predatory loans is if they tried to 
consolidate some secured dept on their house, or if they refinanced to do home repairs. A 
lot of refinances. And also just unstable employment is an issue. Where people have a 
minimum wage job. That would be fine you know, for a moderately or low priced house, 
but they are getting houses that they just cant afford, because these brokers want to make 
a nice big commission.” 
 
“I can tell you what the biggest thing is now, it’s sub-prime lending. It’s the biggest, you 
know with the adjusted rate mortgages. People are buying homes based on what they’re 
making one year and their mortgages are set up to coincide with what they make for two 
or three years but then, in that fourth year, it’s jumping and it’s not jumping at a small 
dollar amount, it’s jumping at a large dollar amount and they find themselves behind the 
eight ball, so that’s one of the biggest right there.” 
 
“Poor money management. Bad Choices from my perspective. I think most of the clients 
that visit us just made a bad choice. They purchased homes that they couldn’t afford to 
support. They had a very risky behavior to start with. They didn’t have the best product 
that was out there. The choices in product, the choices in buying a house that’s affordable 
for them.” 
 
While two of the counselors view the rise in foreclosures from an institutional 
perspective, blaming borrowers’ default upon the structure of the mortgage and real 
estate brokerage industries, another seems to blame the borrowers themselves, criticizing 
there decision-making abilities and skills in money management. Nonetheless, the idea 
that borrowers are being mismatched with loans they simply cannot afford is conveyed in 
all three responses. Every counselors claimed that their organizations were currently 
understaffed, and therefore unable to provide adequate support to all those who demand 
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their services. Two of the counselors asserted that their clients mortgage loans were 
generally sub-prime, and one explains that interest rates on these loans generally reset to 
higher levels three to four years after the loans themselves are issued.  Below I include 
information relating to the number of sub-prime loans issued in Philadelphia from 2000-
2004. When viewing the data it is important to note that the Philadelphia Inquirer 
reported 14,158 sub-prime loans issued to Philadelphia in 2005.
47
 By comparing this 
figure with the statistics presented by dataplace.org in tables 4-6, I conclude that the 
amount of sub-prime loans in Philadelphia has been increasing at least through 2005, 
since the total number these loans issued in 2004 was only 9,380.
48
 
 
Table 4 
Refinancing Mortgage Loans Issued by Sub-Prime Lenders in Philadelphia, PA
49
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Baseden & Dushneskie, 1 
48 Dataplace.org 
49 Dataplace.org 
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Table 5 
 
Home Purchase Mortgage Loans Issued by Sub-prime Lenders in Philadelphia, PA
50
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Home Improvement Loans Issued by Sub-prime Lenders in Philadelphia, PA
51
 
 
 
If rising adjustable interest rates on sub-prime loans are the driving force behind 
the recent rise in foreclosure in Philadelphia, and these interest generally do not reset 
until 3 to four years after the loans themselves have been issued, then it is reasonable to 
conclude that the number of foreclosures in the city will continuing rising at least until 
                                                 
50 Dataplace.org 
51 Dataplace.org 
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2008 or 2009. Furthermore, the Case-Schiller index on the following page shows that 
home values across the country are expected to drop sharply in the coming years. As 
property values fall, fewer borrowers will be inclined to keep up on mortgage payments 
and will likely be subject to foreclosure. For example, if a borrower takes on a $70,000 
loan to purchase a home worth $75,000, and the value of the house falls to $60,000, the 
borrower is left to pay off a loan worth $10,000 more than the home itself. Naturally, the 
borrower in this scenario often opts to abandon their loan. Though housing prices across 
the nation are expected to fall drastically in the coming years, home values in 
Philadelphia have only recently begun to fall at a rate of about one percent per quarter.
52
 
 
Table 7 – Home Prices Throughout America53 
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Conclusions 
There are a number of methodological weaknesses in this research that must be 
taken into account before drawing conclusions based on the data. Variables such as 
Median Income, Poverty Rates and percentage African American are all derived from the 
2000 Census. This means that I have measured correlations between variable values from 
2000, and foreclosure rates in 2005. In addition, the variable which measures the number 
of owner occupied houses within each neighborhood and is the basis for the foreclosure 
index, is also derived from the 2000 Census. Because of the recent rise in sub-prime 
mortgage lending throughout the country, which has extended the opportunity of 
homeownership to previously underserved populations, it is likely that the number of 
owner-occupied houses in Philadelphia was much greater in 2005 than 2000. Therefore, 
the foreclosure indices in this study are probably inflated, with denominators that are too 
low to reflect current numbers of owner occupied housing units throughout the city. 
Finally, measures of unsold foreclosed properties are not a precise gauge of housing 
vacancies. Even after being sold by foreclosing lenders, many properties might still lie 
vacant. Thus, the prevalence of housing vacancy after foreclosure is likely higher than 
reported in this study. 
Despite the aforementioned weaknesses in this study’s methodology, I conclude 
that demographic variables related to property values and racial composition are effective 
predictors of neighborhood foreclosure rates while variables relating to income, poverty 
rates, and income allocation to housing are not. The vast majority of foreclosures 
occurred in neighborhoods with property values ranging from $30,000 to $100,000, even 
though these neighborhoods represent only about a third of all owner-occupied homes in 
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the city. Predominately African American communities with property values ranging 
from $50,000 to $90,000 contained the highest concentrations of foreclosures, along with 
a few predominately Latino communities in Eastern North Philadelphia. Foreclosures 
concentrations within these communities range anywhere from two to six times the city-
wide rate.  
The majority of delinquent borrowers within high-foreclosure areas have acquired 
sub-prime mortgage loans they could not reasonably have been able afford in the long 
term.  As previously articulated by Alan White, in an environment of rapidly appreciating 
property values such as Philadelphia between 2000 and 2005, incentives for mortgage 
lenders to provide affordable loans to their borrowers are not properly aligned.
54
 As long 
as property values continue to rise, it makes little difference to mortgage lenders whether 
or not borrowers will be able to repay their loans. This is because lenders can always 
recoup their losses on unpaid mortgages and collect interest by foreclosing and re-selling 
their borrowers’ homes. Perhaps this explains why foreclosures are tightly concentrated 
within areas with property values between $30,000 and $100,000. In neighborhoods with 
property values below $30,000, the housing stock is not particularly valuable and upon 
foreclosure sale is less likely to produce enough revenue to cover unpaid loans. This 
could discourage sub-prime lenders from issuing unaffordable loans in these 
communities. In areas with property values above $100,000, borrowers might be more 
market-savvy and better suited to acquire affordable prime loans. The added effectiveness 
of neighborhood racial composition in predicting rates of foreclosure is likely due to 
minorities over-representation as borrowers in the sub-prime market. 
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 While foreclosures are not generating large numbers of permanently abandoned 
housing, thousands of foreclosed housing units throughout the city lie vacant for short 
term periods of roughly 9-10 months before they are resold to new owners. These 
vacancies occur almost exclusively in areas with high spatial concentrations of foreclosed 
properties. With the number of foreclosures expected to increase over the next two to 
three years, and mortgage lending standards tightening making it more difficult for 
borrowers to acquire mortgage loans, housing unit vacancies will most likely increase. At 
minimum, hundreds of properties will lie vacant for short-term periods in neighborhoods 
like Elmwood, East Germantown, Overbrook, and West Oak Lane. Houses left vacant in 
such large numbers results in millions of dollars of uncollected mortgage revenues by 
banks and credit unions, while bringing heavy costs upon municipal governments and the 
surrounding communities. If we follow Apgar, Dudey, and Gorey’s (2005) claim that on 
average each foreclosed property costs municipal governments $6,753, we can expect 
foreclosure from mortgage delinquency in 2005 alone bring a financial burden of roughly 
$20,000,000 on the City of Philadelphia. 
 Allowing residents easier access to previously foreclosed homes, even at below-
market prices would likely save the city government millions of dollars, and reduce 
trends of housing vacancy which are beginning to emerge in many of Philadelphia’s 
stable middle-class communities. Long term corrections to mortgage lending standards 
also ought to be developed, which restrict hap-hazard lending practices, especially in 
environments of rapidly appreciating home prices. For example, the Homeowner 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) has only recently begun to expand its role in 
evaluating individual lenders’ commitments to providing loans to minority and low 
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income households, by examining the actual quality these loans with respects to interests 
rates and annual percentage rates.
55
  This is certainly a step in the right direction, but 
HMDA ought to move further, by penalizing lenders for issuing loans with adjustable 
rates capable of rising beyond particular borrowers’ ability to repay. Further research into 
the structure and terms of loans being issued in high-foreclosure areas would be valuable 
in determining what types of lending HMDA should deem as inappropriate. What 
combinations of loan terms and borrower income or credit history most often lead to 
foreclosure? What combinations prove sustainable even in high foreclosure regions? 
While such a high degree of government intervention in the mortgage lending industry 
might seem drastic, we must consider the overall impact of irresponsible lending on the 
depletion of tax revenues, and property values, along with its reduction in consumers’ 
future borrowing and spending capabilities. 
 At the community level, there is an urgent need for residents and housing 
advocates within high-foreclosure neighborhoods to organize. Often times, residents are 
aggressively solicited by sub-prime lenders offering dangerous loans. Efforts to inform 
neighbors about the risks involved in such offers, and about the availability of higher-
quality loan products need to be pursued with at least an equal level of intensity. Those 
who have been able to acquire manageable loans can and should offer valuable insight to 
the rest of their communities, as the value of their properties depend upon the stability of 
their neighbors’ mortgages. Homeownership counselors could make the availability of 
their services better-known to the communities they serve and offer to sit down with 
neighbors and review all prospective loan offers residents might receive. Of course, 
funding for such programs would need to be increased, as most homeownership 
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counseling agencies throughout the city are currently under-staffed and unable to meet 
the needs of all those who already demand their assistance in navigating the difficult road 
to successful homeownership. 
 Future research assessing the long term effects of sub-prime lending upon overall 
homeownership in high foreclosure areas would be useful in determining whether such 
lending is actually damaging communities. It may be that sub-prime lending has granted 
the opportunity for homeownership to such large numbers of Philadelphians, that the 
social costs brought on by housing vacancies and impaired credit scores are outweighed 
by overall gains in real property ownership. Nonetheless, I claim that many borrowers are 
being issued loans they cannot reasonably expect to afford, and I have identified regions 
of this city where these lending mismatches most frequently occur. Such lending 
strategies prey on borrowers inexperience in proper budgeting techniques, and create 
overwhelming social costs borne by people from all walks of life.  When property values 
once again begin to rise across the country, it would be a shame and a burden on our 
society to allow the market for such loans to continue to thrive. 
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Appendix #1 - Interviews 
 
Interview #1 
 
Name of Interviewee: Samantha Arens 
 
Organization: Philadelphia Unemployment Project 
 
Date: Tuesday March 20, 2007. 10:00 AM 
 
 
1) Just to clarify, would you mind describing the organization you work for and what 
your role is as a part of it?  
 
Sure. I work for the Philadelphia Unemployment Project. Well actually, technically I 
work for the Unemployment Information Center, but for funding purposes it is separate 
from P.U.P….I can’t do things like lobbying but functionally I work for the Philadelphia 
Unemployment Project and P.U.P. is a member based organization we offer a bunch of 
different services to people who are low-income and working, or employed, because the 
two are mutually exclusive….to be low income and working. Although we did just get an 
increase in the minimum wage. We try to help people find jobs. We have a community 
organizer and what my job is, mostly what it centers around is trying to help people if 
they are in foreclosure. 
 
 
 
2) What regions of Philadelphia do you serve? Do you find your clients come mostly 
from specific neighborhoods or areas of the city in particular? 
 
Well, we serve everywhere in Philadelphia and I get people from outside of Philadelphia 
aswell. Umm, but I started this map with dots on it. But I didn’t get very far. I haven’t 
been keeping track. But you can see it’s mostly in the North and the Southwest.  
 
Adrian: You know, that’s interesting because I did…you know the Sheriff’s Department 
they post a list of the foreclosure notices they send out online and I made sort of, I was 
wondering if my research was accurate, but I made sort of a random list, I took a random 
sample out of all the addresses to which foreclosure notices were sent and I mapped 
them, and it was all in like West Oak Line, Germantown, and Southwest and only one 
neighborhoods in the top ten foreclosure areas was in North Philadelphia. So it was the 
same distribution you have put on there [on her map]  
 
Samantha: Hmm…Minority neighborhoods. One things that I think we mentioned in the 
department of banking hearing is that umm, I don’t even know if this is the right 
terminology, it’s something our organizer came up with but it’s called de-facto redlining. 
Apparently red lining was a big thing back in the day…I don’t know much about it but 
essentially…brokers will target certain neighborhoods. 
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3) On average how many payments has a client missed by the time they come in to 
see you ;none, 3 months, 6 months, etc. 
 
Usually, unfortunately, and it would be easier to help people if they came in earlier but I 
usually see people I mean it varies from like two months to two years behind. The only 
way they could be up to two years is if they stretched it out with bankruptcy or something 
like that. But I’m not sure on average. I’d say maybe on average 6 months, at which point 
the person is already on foreclosure. Because we do a lot of appeal hearings for a 
program called HEMAP, which can help get people assistance and it was designed for 
temporary unemployment to help people out with that. It was started in the 1970’s and 
PUP helped start that program but now we are trying to fit people with predatory and 
subprime loans into that program, which doesn’t really work, and so we are trying to get 
funding for other programs that would help bail people out who have predatory loans, get 
them a fixed rate umm, but what was the question? 
 
Adrian: Just how many times has a client missed a mortgage payment… 
 
Samantha: Oh, right. So when we do the appeal hearings, at that point they’ve already 
gone through the initial stages of the foreclosure process so by the time they get to us it’s 
like 6 months. 
 
 
4) If you had to isolate a single cause that you would say is most responsible for 
your clients being faced with potential foreclosure, what would it be? For 
example, would you say that predatory lending is the most common cause your 
clients default, would it be, unemployment, reduction of income, lack of the 
necessary budgeting skills or some type of financial mismanagement, lack of 
affordable housing, family issues, divorce, death in the family or some other 
cause I haven’t mentioned? 
 
I would say some of the tops one are….sub-prime lending, I think is a big one, and that’s 
not necessarily predatory lending but one of the top reasons for people falling behind 
with sub-prime loans or predatory loans is if they tried to consolidate some secured dept 
on their house, or if they refinanced to do home repairs. A lot of refinances. And also just 
unstable employment is an issue. Where people have a minimum wage job. That would 
be fine you know, for a moderately or low priced house, but they are getting houses that 
they just cant afford, because these brokers want to make a nice big commission.  
 
Adrian: So you think that with minimum wage it’s possible to buy a house? 
 
Samantha: Well sometimes people have outside sources of help like they either get 
stamps or they have a family member living with them. Yea but it’s probably not possible 
to work a minimum wage job alone, and be a homeowner. And a lot of brokers tap into 
the American dream for people who just don’t have the money. And everyone wants to 
be a homeowner, but unfortunately some people can’t afford that. 
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5) What are some of the more secondary causes in your opinion? 
 
Umm. Well..Addiction, death in the family, unexpected expenses like maybe a medical 
bill. Either lose of somebody whose income used to be a source of support or an 
unexpected expense. Also financial mismanagement like maybe putting car payment 
ahead of a mortgage payment. Which you know sometimes is stupid but sometimes is a 
catch 22 if you need the car to get to work. 
 
 
6) What method of loss mitigation have you found most successful in helping clients 
to avert foreclosure? 
 
Umm, well, with FHA mortgages there are certain regulations that the lender has to 
follow to a avoid foreclosure and with conventional mortgages. So that like we can 
appeal to those and the lender so that we can say they may follow them they don’t have 
to. But with FHA mortgages you have a little bit of power to go and approach the 
mortgage companies for loss mitigation. Whereas with the conventional mortgages the 
main tool we have is HEMAP Homeowners Emergency Mortgage Assistance Loan 
program which can give the person up to 24 months of assistance but, for people with 
adjustable rates and mortgages they can’t afford that’s not really helpful. And I can also 
try loss mitigation with the HEMAP cases but there’s not really any guidelines the 
mortgage company is able to follow. So.. the most effective loss mitigation tool is 
probably a loan modification because it spreads the delinquency out over the furthest 
period of time, so that person has to pay less each month. Whereas if you do like a 
forbearance or something like that if you approach the mortgage company they may 
spread it out by only six months so if you owe $10,000 that can be a significant amount 
for somebody to have to pay. When you call the mortgage company up you get somebody 
in collections and they’re just like bulldogs trying to get their money. So you really have 
to get to the loss mitigation department and sometimes that’s difficult, so that’s my 
tactics. 
 
 
7) What generally happens to those who aren’t able to escape. Do they face 
homelessness, do they acquire rental housing, or simply lower cost mortgages? 
 
All of those things. They do face homelessness. It’s hard because sometimes people come 
in a couple days before the Sheriff’s Sale and for whatever reason they haven’t, or 
they’ve been through, they just come to our office late and there is really nothing we can 
do. But even so sometimes I see somebody from the very beginning and they try 
everything just nothing works. And those people sometimes would move in with a family 
member or maybe be bounced around for a little while. You know I’ve had people come 
into me and say: “I’ve been homeless before you know, I know what I’m facing” . 
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Sometimes I recommend that people take a couple years, like if it’s pretty much clear that 
they’re going to lose their home I recommend that they sell it and maybe do a short sale 
with the mortgage company and take a couple years to rebuild their credit, and then get a 
mortgage with a reasonable payment that is a fixed rate. 
 
Adrian: And in the mean time just to rent? 
 
Samantha: Yea. 
 
 
8) Do you find you have more potential clients than you are able to serve? 
 
Yes, and we are actually going to hire somebody else. You know I’ve only been here for 
about eight months so I don’t know comparatively what volume was like previously but I 
have definitely been feeling a little overloaded. We’ve been doing a lot of appeal 
hearings for the HEMAP program, and have been getting a lot more people coming in. 
And I see all these articles that foreclosure rates are increasing and this is something that 
Wall Street is just starting to notice but 
 
 
9) What changes in public policy, in the housing markets, or in the communities 
themselves that you serve would allow your clients more manageable access to 
homeownership? 
 
Well, I think there are some regulations before the department of banking and there is a 
package of legislation that I believe Governor Rendell has put forward that would make it 
more difficult for lenders to give unaffordable loans, that would make it illegal for them 
to do that and if you want to see a copy of those regulations I can probably find them. 
 
And I was going to tell you one more thing. When you were talking about like 
Homeownership as a way of increasing wealth and being able to borrow on that, the 
problem is that when people inherit a house from somebody in their family and then 
refinance, based on the equity, those refinances are almost always sub-prime loans, I 
mean of the people that I see anyway. And so, you know, some people….a lot of people 
take those loans but it’s tight for them but they do it and some people default on them. So 
you know, having the equity in your house to borrow on isn’t always something that 
makes people wealthier. It takes the wealth away from them when the way they borrow 
isn’t regulated. 
 
And you know, the counselor that was in this position before me was saying, when he 
sees white people and he tells them to, this is the way he told me I don’t know if that’s 
true or not. But he’s like “when I see white people and I am like, you are going to have to 
sell your home” they say “yea alright I’ll sell my home, maybe get another mortgage in 
the future” “but when I see black people and tell them that they are going to have to lose 
their home, they are like no freakin way, I’ll do everything I can to save my home, 
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especially like if it is a home that has been passed down to them” Now that may be a 
gross generalization but I’m just reporting what he said. 
 
 
 
Interview #2 
 
Name of Interviewee: Ms. Atkins 
 
Organization: West Oak Lane CDC 
 
Date: March 29, 2007 
 
 
1) Just to clarify, would you mind describing the organization you work for and what 
your role is as a part of it?  
 
We’re a counseling agency primarily we do all kinds of counseling. We do pre-purchase, 
dept and delinquency, pre-loan, tax delinquency, mortgage delinquency, and general 
counseling. Post purchase counseling…all kinds of counseling here. 
 
 
 
2) What regions of Philadelphia do you serve? Do you find your clients come mostly 
from specific neighborhoods or areas of the city in particular? 
 
The City of Philadelphia. So that sometimes we have clients come in from West 
Philadelphia, South Philadelphia, all over. The young lady that just left here she if from 
West Philly. Why they come this far I don’t know. I just know we don’t advertise and so 
that they’re all from word of mouth. People that have been here referred them and so on 
and so fourth and that’s how we get our clients. 
 
 
3) On average how many payments has a client missed by the time they come in to 
see you ;none, 3 months, 6 months, etc. 
 
 
It can range anywhere from 3 months. Usually by the time that they get here they are at 
least 3 months delinquent. Now we have had people come in for the first time when they 
are a year delinquent. It depends on the client. Some clients tend to ignore the problem 
until they get to the point where they’re getting threatening notices that there is going to 
be a sheriff’s sale and then they come in which is kind of late in the process. 
 
 
4) If you had to isolate a single cause that you would say is most responsible for 
your clients being faced with potential foreclosure, what would it be? For 
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example, would you say that predatory lending is the most common cause your 
clients default, would it be, unemployment, reduction of income, lack of the 
necessary budgeting skills or some type of financial mismanagement, lack of 
affordable housing, family issues, divorce, death in the family or some other 
cause I haven’t mentioned? 
 
Poor money management. Bad Choices from my perspective. I think most of the clients 
that visit us just made a bad choice. They purchased homes that they couldn’t afford to 
support. They had a very risky behavior to start with. They didn’t have the best product 
that was out there. The choices in product, the choices in buying a house that’s affordable 
for them. And I tell the client “affordable for you is going to differ from what’s 
affordable to the person sitting next to you even though you have exactly the same salary 
and generally you might even be buying the same house. But if you have to pick up 
medicine from the drugstore and you have to pay a deductible of $100 a month, you need 
to calculate that in your affordability. If you have an infant that takes $200 dollars a week 
in daycare you have to calculate that in. So you are not going to be able to afford what the 
person sitting next to you is.” And part of it is because of our habits. Our habits of the 
way we make purchases the way we live our lives if we choose to go to the movies on 
occasion and spend money doing that. All of it has to do with the behavior and 
relationship that the family has as a family unit because that’s how that money gets spent. 
The other thing is they sometimes have bad priorities. They choose to pay their car 
payment or to buy a car that’s not affordable and they make that payment on time and 
their mortgage is 3 or 4 months behind. But the car payment was never late. Just bad 
choices. That’s just from my perspective. Now sometimes, it’s not that persons fault 
because they may have gotten laid off and they couldn’t find a new job quick enough for 
them to be able to cure their problems. But often times I would say at least more than 
seventy percent of the people come here and when we do the counseling we can see that 
that person just made some bad choices. 
 
Adrian: And so of those in the 70%, you mean if they had better spending habits they would be 
able to afford the houses that they bought. 
 
Ms. Atkins: If they made better choices not necessarily their spending habits. I happen to 
think that people use credit cards badly. Part of what we have to pay back is the other 
debts and responsibilities. They make bad choices. There are people for example who 
may say: “I choose to put my heat on 75 degrees rather than turn the thermostat down, 
put on some thermal underwear and a turtle neck and so on and so forth, because I know 
that this gas bill is going to cost me $500 dollars next month and I can’t afford that.” And 
I try to encourage the client, before you get the bill you want to think about what you are 
spending. You want to think about making a different kind of choice and putting the 
thermal on. Put several layers of clothing on if necessary so that gas bill you get may be 
$200, and that may be affordable because if your utility costs and your other costs are too 
expensive and too high, you are going to have a problem and you don’t want to wait until 
you have the problem to realize that you’re in crisis. You want to try to make better 
choices long before you have a crisis. People use credit cards and accumulate dept on 
credit cards, pay high interest rates and their not caring about the interest rate that they 
are paying. I ask people all the time. How much is the interest rate that you pay on that 
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particular credit card that you have and they’ll say oh I don’t know but I know that it’s 
not too high, but I really don’t know what it is. And it’s telling me that they are not 
paying attention to what they are doing. At least I believe it’s something that they need to 
pay closer attention to. Because I think people use credit cards badly. I happen to be a 
person that believes that what you buy this month you should pay this month unless you 
have an emergency. And an emergency may be that a hot water tank broke and you don’t 
want to have to take cold showers for three months until you can afford it. But buying 
that shirt and those slacks or whatever, I believe what you buy this month you should pay 
this month and therefore and choose a credit card that if you pay the full balance every 
month you won’t pay interest. I think people need to stop paying interest on credit cards. 
Because that interest that they are accruing on tat credit card, over the years they pay 
thousands of dollars on interest because you are paying interest on interest on the item 
that you bought five years ago you don’t even own, but you are still trying to pay it off. 
All of that is what creates the delinquency.  The person does not just wake up and decide 
I’m not going to make my mortgage payment. The person develops a pattern of behavior 
that hinders them from being more progressive and get out of dept or manage their 
money. It’s a problem that is a massive problem. I see it even in the pre-purchase stages, 
and when I’m saying to my client “I want you to buy affordably. Just because you’re 
paying rent that is $400 dollars a month and you’re saving $200 a month, I don’t want 
you to go out there and buy that $600 dollar a month mortgage payment because that 
mortgage payment you’re not going to be able to afford unless you change your pattern 
of behavior because I need you to have a mandatory savings every single month. So even 
after you buy the home you’ll have a savings and I believe people should have at least a 
minimum of two savings for their expenses. Not their retirement plan that’s something 
totally different. But I think people should put away some money every month for that 
what if time. What if I get laid off, and what if the car breaks down. So that if there is $25 
of pay that you’re putting away you never touch that. So if you never have a what if time, 
and you have at the end of your budget after a monthly allowance, you’d have money left 
over like I believe you should for your regular savings that you go to the movies with and 
you go on vacation with and so forth. If you never have that then this money is accruing 
interest in CDs and bank accounts so that you can eventually use that money as one of the 
additional resources of your retirement.  
 
 
I think that many times what we do, and what we may choose to do is clearly our choice, 
but it also can be a negative factor from my perspective. Because the clients make bad 
choices. I’ve had clients that come here that have been delinquent but they choose to stop 
at MacDonalds and get their breakfast their lunch or their dinner. They just make bad 
choices I look at their bank statements because one of the things we request is the bank 
statements to be submitted to use for two months. And the purpose of me getting that is 
so I can look at it to see what the pattern is. Sometimes the pattern is, I pay twenty dollars 
in ATM fees, because I choose not to go to the bank that I got my debit card with or 
whatever and so I see that as a waste of money. That $20 could have gone towards your 
savings or towards getting yourself out of dept. But it’s the clients often times that can 
least afford it that have some of the worst habits. They’re the ones that are paying the 
highest interest rates, they have bad credit, but I may see on that particular clients bank 
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statement that they choose to spend $150 to get their hair done. But the mortgage is late. 
Or I have clients say to me. But my kids deserve these toys I had to get them something 
for Christmas but I choose not to make the mortgage payment. And I say to them “Your 
child deserves to have a roof over their head. They don’t deserve, they need to have a 
place after Christmas to put the toys.” Most of the time, it’s bad choices. It’s the way they 
manage the money.  
 
Now there are a substantial number of people that made all of the right choices and life 
just gave them a kick so that they got laid off or they got sick. And now they’re on social 
security disability before they may have been making $2000 dollars a month and now 
they’re getting social security disability because their health declined, and so that’s why 
they are late, THERE ARE A SUBSTANIAL NUMBER OF THOSE PEOPLE. But 
sometimes even clients that have that kind of situation, I say to them, you might want to, 
because you know that you’re never going to be able to make that mortgage payment 
again, before things get too bad you may want to consider, since your health is not in 
good condition, to see if you can seek subsidized housing, find out if you can live with 
family members, consider selling the home. The equity that you have in a property may 
be enough for you to be able to comfortably live or buy a house that may be cheaper. 
Take the equity that you get from the sale of the property and buy another house, pay it 
off because it you’ll have a paid off mortgage and you’ll have real estate taxes that are 
affordable. And if you get better, then you can make different kinds of choices again. But 
everybody makes their own choice. 
 
Adrian: And if you can say, what do you think is at the root of people miss-prioritizing, putting 
the car or the children’s toys before the mortgage payment? 
 
Ms. Atkins: Well, some of it comes with their attitude about what their priorities are. 
Some of it comes through lack of direction. I think a major part of it is because they 
didn’t grow up in an environment where that was a normal part of somebodies lifestyle, 
“My parents never taught me to save, my parents never taught me to make different kinds 
of choices” But that doesn’t mean that it is all their parents fault. Sometimes it’s because 
that person could have made a different kind of choice and we can’t blame everything on 
our parents. It’s about us being willing to pay attention, and to want to think about what 
we are doing. Not everything we learn from our parents. People say to me well, it was my 
birthday and I deserved to go on this, I had a client actually that went on vacation. She 
was delinquent on her mortgage. But she felt every birthday she deserves to go away. So 
she went on vacation for a week. Now, I don’t have a clue how to cure a situation like 
that, other than to say are you an idiot? Because from my perspective, what’s your 
thought process? What makes you think you deserve to go on vacation when you said 
that I wanted to have a home, keeping a roof over your head it what you deserve to do. I 
don’t, I can’t figure out sometimes where that persons mind is but I have a lot of people 
say things like that to me, and I simply say to them. Well, from my perspective you made 
a bad choice. You made the wrong choice. Your choice should have been to take that 
money and to put it toward the mortgage. Because next week you might not have any 
place to put the furniture just yet. Or any place to turn your electricity on. Sometimes 
even utilities. We have to slow down and start spending what we can afford. If I were 
struggling trying to make ends meet, I wouldn’t be leaving the lights on. There’s a house 
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that is on my way to work I passed it.  Last Christmas that house was lit up just like a, 
somebody celebrating something that was….it was really well lit. With all kinds of 
Christmas decorations and things and then in February I saw that it was boarded up as if 
it was a property that was being Sheriff’s Sale. And I’m thinking to myself what was her 
thought. I mean you don’t just get there. The time between Sheriff’s Sale and the time 
that your spending your utilities, there is a major gap there. There are months and months 
that go by by the time they get the civil judgments and so forth. But I’m thinking why 
would you put all of that decoration, pay that enormous electric bill if you know you 
can’t afford it. That didn’t make sense to me. But it obviously must have made sense to 
the person living there because they are in that situation. But they shouldn’t have done it. 
You don’t put anything up or you put just something that doesn’t require electricity. But 
they make choices like that and I don’t know why. I mean I haven’t yet figured out. 
Sometimes people keep saying to me “Well, nobody ever taught me” that’s what I hear a 
lot. Some of it is common sense from my perspective. We don’t tell people what to do. 
We tell them what options are available to them and ask them to gather other information 
and make a good choice. And we tell them what from our perspective, we think would 
make a good choice or the better choice and you know they are allowed to do what they 
want to do. 
 
 
 
5) And of the clients you see that are facing foreclosure how many do you think have 
refinanced vs. how many are in default of their original mortgage ? 
 
Well. Many of them. I would say for at least 60% of them or 75% it’s their original 
money mortgage, it’s the purchase money mortgage. We are seeing less and less 
predatory issues because for years we worked with OHCD to try to resolve as much as 
possible those predatory issues. OHCD had developed a program called the phil-plus and 
mini-phil where you could get loans that were not predatory. The condition of those loans 
were that you go to counseling before your loan can be awarded. So that helps some I 
think because we have a lot of people coming in for Phil plus loans and there are no fees 
associated with those loans. But again it’s about choice. Some of it is about informing 
people, some of it is just about education…making people aware of the choices but 
sometimes even when we make people aware of it they continue to choose the wrong 
thing. 
 
 
6) What method of loss mitigation have you found most successful in helping clients 
to avert foreclosure? 
 
 
Well. In terms of the lose mitigation. The forbearance agreement sometimes special 
forbearance agreements with some clients where they had a period of times where they 
needed to clear the problem. In terms of, if they have a conventional product the HEMAP 
Program is a wonderful program if it’s not their fault that they got into that situation. 
Because HEMAP says, we will assist you by taking all of that delinquency with the 
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mortgage payment and spreading it over four or five years. Whatever period they choose 
for that client. Spread it over a period of years and you have to pay us back on a monthly 
basis for that particular loan and be able to financially  afford to make your mortgage 
payment and pay your dept on time.  That’s a wonderful tool.  
 
Sometimes with some of the lenders with some of the FHA mortgages they can be very 
difficult lenders. And trying to get them to respond sometimes we have to get HUD 
involved because the lender isn’t willing to be as receptive as they should to try to get 
them on a payment plan or put the delinquency portion at the end of the loan for 
somebody that has a good history and life gave them a little kick and they have a 
situation. 
 
Or refinancing we use all the tools that are available to use to try to assist people. 
 
 
 
7) What generally happens to those who aren’t able to escape. Do they face 
homelessness, do they acquire rental housing, or simply lower cost mortgages? 
 
The end up being foreclosed on and looking for alternative housing. Because there is no 
way for us to get them out of that. I’ve had people making religious contributions because 
of their thought process. Every month that might have been their mortgage payment or 
very close to at least making up for those delinquent 3, or 4, or 5 mortgage payments. 
And I say them if you stop doing this for a period of time, you will be able to catch up 
with your mortgage payment and that really bothers me a lot. But sometimes they listen. 
One of my clients more recently, he’s retired, and he’s saying but the church that I belong 
to if you don’t tide, regardless of what your situation is, if you don’t tide then you can’t 
belong. And I say well you need to think about whether you should belong to that church 
or not. That’s a personal thing but I did say to him that what you need to do is go too the 
church and say I have a lot of time is there something I can tide in terms of my time 
rather than my money. Now that church did allow him to do that. But sometimes it’s just 
that people make bad decisions.  
 
 
8) Of all clients that request your services, what proportion would you say you are 
able to serve? 
 
Not enough of them. We try to, anybody that calls here, even though we have a lot of 
stress with it, anybody that calls here we try to fit them into our counseling. That’s one of 
the reasons we don’t advertise. And we try to work with them to accomplish whatever the 
goal is whether it’s pre-purchase or tax delinquency or whatever the goal is. 
 
Not enough. If there was more funding, we could get assistance, even clerical assistance 
so we wouldn’t have to do a lot of the paper work and stuff, then we may be able to 
service additional people. 
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9) What changes in public policy, in the housing markets, or in the communities 
themselves that you serve would allow your clients more manageable access to 
homeownership? 
 
Better information. I think that for most people anyway, they need to better informed they 
need to make better choices, and also times when I talk with them even at the 
delinquency level they say well if I had known that I wouldn’t have gotten into this 
situation. I hear that repeatedly all the time. Well if I knew that a counseling agency was 
there, I can do it now but it’s too late for me. Well it’s not necessarily over because they 
still have a life even after foreclosure but the way they manage their lives would be 
different. 
 
10) Are there specific mortgage lenders or brokers that you recommend to your 
clients? If so, which lenders or brokers do you recommend and why? Is the responsibility 
of finding a broker left more to the client? 
 
I try not to recommend people. I do give them information and options. I tend to want for 
the client to use the banks primarily their mortgage entities for example, there are five 
banks that have what is called a first front door program and so they offer people that 
qualify, resources, a grant of up to $5,000 towards the closing costs, and if they are in the 
income guidelines for HUD. There a five banks that do that. So I tell them about those 
particular banks because they are able to get a little bit more. The banks use their CRA 
credits to underwrite the fees and the interest rates or provide grants. The banks are PNC, 
Beneficial Savings Bank, Commerce Bank Sovereign Bank, and Citizen Bank. They are 
the five banks that have that particular product which is a wonderful product. It gives the 
clients a little bit more. We try not to tell them what to do. We give them options and let 
them make choices. There are some banks, Bank of America is one that doesn’t do the 
First Front Door but they use some their CRA credits to underwrite the mortgage 
insurance, which is going to save somebody money on their mortgage payments to. So 
the mortgage insurance for some people that qualify, they won’t have to pay that. And 
they have a little bit more liberal view on who may qualify for their mortgage than some 
of the others because they allow some undocumented income or people that are not a part 
of the mortgage like the spouse one person has good credit they get the mortgage in their 
name but the spouse may have the savings or additional income that’s part of that family 
and that can be used with that particular lender so if a client has a low income but they 
have spousal assistance but then that client may be a better candidate to that particular 
lender. 
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Interview #3 
 
Name of Interviewee: Mr. Oden, Ms. Pryer, and  Ms. Prater (all Housing Counselors at  
Germantown Settlement) 
 
Organization: Germantown Settlement  
 
Date: April 26, 2007 
 
 
Adrian: If you had to isolate a single cause that you would say is most responsible for 
your clients being faced with potential foreclosure, what would it be? For example, 
would you say that predatory lending is the most common cause your clients default, 
would it be, unemployment, reduction of income, lack of the necessary budgeting skills or 
some type of financial mismanagement, lack of affordable housing, family issues, divorce, 
death in the family or some other cause I haven’t mentioned? 
 
Mr. Oden: I can tell you what the biggest thing is now, it’s Sub-Prime Lending. It’s the 
biggest, you know with the adjusted rate mortgages. People are buying homes based on 
what they’re making one year and their mortgages are set up to coincide with what they 
make for two or three years but then, in that fourth year, it’s jumping and it’s not jumping 
at a small dollar amount, it’s jumping at a large dollar amount and they find themselves 
behind the eight ball, so that’s one of the biggest right there. 
 
Ms. Pryer: Others reasons are that people have been fired from their job, or laid off. This 
is definitely one of the reasons why people are falling behind in their mortgage. Also, I 
would say death, spousal death, reduction in income, medical conditions. 
 
Mr. Oden: I have a client who’s got one now. He has got about $500,000 in dept. He had 
a heart transplant, and his insurance did pay a portion of the costs but now he has got 
$500,000 in loans there to pay that bill of not to mention the fact that he is paying $150 a 
month in medication, and he’s going through foreclosure. 
 
Ms. Prater: I think there was another one, a young lady who had an aneurism and two 
strokes behind that. So there’s another case of health issues causing people to fall behind 
in their mortgages. However I do think from my experiences as a counselor with clients, 
if they had come into our office or any housing counseling agency to get the assistance 
and the knowledge, most of the clients that we have serviced, and we see about 300 to 
400 clients a year, most of them with keep their home or maintain their home. They will 
not go into foreclosure if they do find themselves in that position they’ll contact us or 
they will contact the proper people. The problem is, one of the things that we are going to 
do based on information Mr. Oden is we want to get the information out there to people. 
Because people are afraid to open up the mail. They know they are behind, they know 
that they can’t pay for it. They’re two or three months behind and they’re afraid to open 
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up the mail because they think the first things that’s going to happen is that they are 
going to have their homes taken. When in reality the information in the mail actually 
says…intent to foreclosure, but we are here to help you seek some counseling. So we 
want to encourage people to open up their envelopes, so we can help them, so agencies 
can help them. Even with utilities, people are afraid to talk to the utility companies 
because they know their utilities are going to be turned off, they know they are two to 
three months behind, they know they are getting phone calls from people saying we need 
this amount of money. But they don’t know that they have a right to negotiate. So they 
have to be able to understand and learn those things.  
 
Adrian: Do you serve clients mostly from Germantown and the surrounding area or from 
all over Philadelphia? 
 
 
Mr. Oden: I have clients now who are going through foreclosure and they are from 
Plymouth Meeting. We also get people from the Northeast, from South Philly, and all 
over. 
 
Ms. Prater: Our main focus is Germantown because we are located here, we are a 
neighborhood center, so people in the neighborhood will come to us. Why people come 
from other areas I don’t know but they do. There are agencies in their vicinity but they 
choose to come here and more than likely probably some from Germantown may go 
elsewhere for assistance. But we all do the same work. These counseling centers do the 
same work. There’s no competition or anything, there are enough people falling behind 
unfortunately. We serve Philadelphia and the surrounding area under the HEMAP 
program which is funded by the state. 
 
Adrian: You were saying earlier that you would like to get the word out to people that 
you can solve the problem of foreclosure you just have to come to us sooner. But say that 
you were to do that and you increased the volume of clients that you have. Would you 
then be able to handle that new volume or would you need to hire more people? 
 
Ms. Prater: We would definitely need to hire more people. I wish you were hear during 
the crisis time. I wish I had allowed you to come here so you could see the multitude of 
people. We are talking more than a hundred a day. Now mind you I have a staff of 
between 5 and 6 people. These are homeownership counselors. But during mid winter, 
they rarely breathe they rarely eat, they rarely take breaks. We could handle the volume, 
but not the way we would want to. To me actually it’s like putting a band aid on these 
clients because for some programs, such as the utility program where people are behind 
on their utilities, it’s a band aid. They come here every year they know they can get this 
service they know they can get this program. However they are back in the same situation 
unless we teach them life skills, budgeting, how to manage their budgets in order for 
them to be able take care of it during the Fall season when the high utility costs hit.  
 
With default and delinquency it’s different because you have to sit down for more than 
two hours with a client because you have to find out the ins and outs. What are they not 
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saying? What are they not saying that they should be telling us so we can hopefully help 
you get this funding from the state which is very difficult sometimes to be approved. For 
whatever reason. 
 
Adrian: The HEMAP program? 
 
Ms. Prater: Yes. You can do an excellent letter, showing this is the perfect candidate to 
get state assistance and they don’t. You can also do a horrible letter, in a situation where 
you think the client is not going to get it, and they do.  
 
Ms. Pryer: We do have a few clients that come in and have fallen behind on their 
mortgages do to money management. For example, we had one women who came in and 
fell behind in her mortgage because she said her daughter was graduating. You know her 
daughter graduated from high school and she wanted to give her daughter a nice 
graduation celebration. And that’s where her money went, towards the graduation. An 
that’s where the budget counseling and so forth and they have to learn to prioritize. 
Certainly we understand that you want to see your child have a nice graduation. But 
obviously what’s more important is to pay your bills and keep a roof over your head. 
  
Ms. Prater: And Ms. Pryer brings up a good point about different cultures and different 
areas. For instance, say for example with that family she was discussing, the daughter 
was the first person in that family to graduate. To her, this was a lifetime opportunity and 
to her, that was a life changing event. But if you try to explain that to a mortgage 
company they will say: Are you crazy?  
 
Another thing is, I remember about Comcast, or cable. Cable is a situation where we will 
say “cut it off. That is a $100 or so dollars a month”. But to them, they don’t want their 
child outside. It’s dangerous, there is all kinds of different things going on outside the 
home. We actually one a case on that because they want to keep their children, not to say 
that they want them to watch television, but that’s their entertainment not out here 
playing in the streets with the possibility of getting stabbed, especially today when this 
city is being called Kill-adelphia. We don’t want kids out in the street we want them 
home. I want my kids home. People have different ways of thinking. And honestly, I 
can’t say cable is not a priority. It’s a priority to them so we have to be careful. Even 
mortgage companies, in some cases they need to stop being so rigid and strict. 
 
Mr. Oden: Another things is, sadly enough, a lot of times clients won’t give the full story 
even when they come to see us. In those cases we have to try to guess, and speculate. As 
to what the real problem is. The other counselors here have taught me well. There are 
times when someone comes in, you know from the door whether their story is liable or 
whether it’s Memorex and a lot of times, it’s Memorex. But that doesn’t stop use from 
trying to give them %100 service.  
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Adrian: Just out of curiosity, you say that subprime lending is the biggest problem, but 
how difficult is it to find a prime loan for someone with a low income during pre-
purchase counseling?   
 
Ms. Prater: It’s not that it is really difficult. People in default and delinquency counseling 
are usually coming in because when they bought their homes, they didn’t seek counseling 
so they didn’t know they had all of these options.. When these clients come in for 
counseling one of the things we do is a workshop. We deal with reputable lenders like 
Commerce Bank, Beneficial Bank, Countrywide, all these different mortgage companies 
who are affiliated with other state programs that are available to assist low income 
people. There are many programs out their to assist borrowers with up front and closing 
costs on their mortgages. We get quite a few clients coming in here whose credit ratings 
are pretty good. I would say 75% are not ready, but the other 25% are and by offering 
more and more of these workshops, we are finding more and more clients who are ready. 
Even with clients who have credit issues, they can rectify them, they make negotiations 
and agreements and get a letter of satisfaction saying that everything is paid of…boom 
they can get a mortgage and we want to make sure that they can get one with a good 
interest rate. With the cost of properties going up, that was an issue to at one time. My 
house, when I bought mine it was only about 45,000. Now it’s worth 100 and some 
thousands. The values of these houses has tripled. So now it’s difficult for a low to 
moderate income person to just get a normal row home. So that might be a factor that is 
changing things too because at one point where interest rates were 4% or 5% and you 
could get a house for $50,000 in a nice twin, now that costs $200,000. That’s a huge 
jump. People can’t afford it. 
 
Adrian: What I’ve found it that the neighborhoods with the highest foreclosure rates are 
either in Southwest Philadelphia, or in West Oak Lane, Germantown, East Germantown, 
Logan and I’m just wondering why these neighborhoods are so hard hit by foreclosures? 
 
Ms. Prater: I don’t know. I can’t even give you that answer yet because I don’t know. 
 
Mr. Oden: I also want to mention that many of the clients I see are seniors. The first 
clients I saw, I knew their family. Their house was paid-off, but they had some 
remodeling done and unfortunately the contractor he used came with his own financing, 
and the family signed away and signed away and signed away ad before they knew it, 
they’re now paying, when they only wanted $3,500 worth of work done, now their bill is 
about $4,000 to $5,000. I see a lot of the elderly falling for that.  
 
Ms. Prater: Even though we haven’t looked into this I guarantee you that part of the 
reasons the neighborhoods you mentioned are hit so hard is because of the predatory 
loans, home-equity and home improvement loans. One thing that will happen is 
contractors will say well ok, I know you want to get your heater fixed for 2,000 but you if 
you allow us to do X.Y.Z., the catch is we’ll loan you some cash aswell as part of this 
loan. The cash is going to be what going to motivate people to say ok, I’ll sign this 
$25,000 contract, and next thing you know they can’t afford it and once they get done 
with this they are going to lose of their money.  
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Appendix 3 
Bk Lender Property Address 
Actually 
Foreclosed? 
Months 
Before 
Resale 
Not Yet 
Resold? 
Property 
Sold Before 
Sheriff's 
Sale Zip DATE 
205-303 SFJV, LLC 3050 Fairfield Street 0   19136 1/4/2005 
205-316 Beneficial Savings Bank 
227 East Meehan 
Avenue 0   19119 1/4/2005 
205-321 Midfirst Bank 
1441 East 
Cheltenham Avenue 0   19124 1/4/2005 
205-332 
Associates First Capital Corp, successor by merger of 
Consumer Discount Corporation 
114 W. Cliveden 
Street 0   19119 1/4/2005 
205-347 
Wachovia Bank as Trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 1351 Westbury Drive 0   19151 1/4/2005 
205-358 EMC Mortgage Corporation 4123 Glendale Street 1 8 0 19124 1/4/2005 
205-364 GMAC Mortgage Corporation 
2649  South 67th 
Street 1 2 0 19142 1/4/2005 
205-379 Mortgage Electonic Registration Systems, Inc. 2111 Larue Street 1 1 0 19124 1/4/2005 
205-384 
Wells Fargo Bank as Trustee for Option One Mortgage 
Loan Trust 304 Crest Park Road 0  0 19119 1/4/2005 
205-392 
Citifinancial Mortgage Co Inc. f/k/a Ford Consumer 
Discount Company 
6118 Columbia 
Avenue 1 5 0 19151 1/4/2005 
205-404 
Wachovia Bank as Trustee for Security National Remic 
Trust 148 North 60th Street 0  0 19139 1/4/2005 
205-416 GE Mortgage Services LLC Travelers Mortgage Services 
12249 Sweet Briar 
Road 1 2 0 19154 1/4/2005 
205-428 Bank of America, N.A. 
2720 W. Allegheny 
Avenue 0  0 19132 1/4/2005 
205-432 
Wells Fargo Bank s/b/m to Norwest Bank as trustee of 
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities 3943 Donath Street 0  0 19140 1/4/2005 
205-447 Wells Fargo Bank 
1114 East Cliveden 
Street 0  0 19119 1/4/2005 
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205-454 PNC Bank 5723 Walker Street 0  0 19135 1/4/2005 
205-466 Wachovia Bank 932 Sigel Street  0  0 19148 1/4/2005 
205-479 
Wachovia Bank as Trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 156 Roselyn Street 1 2 0 19120 1/4/2005 
205-482 JP Morgan Chase Bank as trustee for the CSFB trust 
7830 Woolston 
Avenue 1 9 0 19150 1/4/2005 
205-496 GMAC Mortgage Corporation 
10129 Buselton 
Avenue 1 1 1 0 19116 1/4/2005 
205-505 
U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for EDCC 
Home Equity Loan Trust 
7340 Woodcrest 
Avenue     19139 1/4/2005 
205-520 Columbia National, Inc.  5814 Penn Street 1 14 1 0 19149 1/4/2005 
205-529 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 6414 Buist Avenue 0  0 19142 1/4/2005 
205-536 
GRP Financial Services Corp, assignee of New Century 
Mortgage Corp 
545 W. Duncannon 
Street 1 5 0 19120 1/4/2005 
205-545 ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc. 272 Slocum Street 1 5 0 19119 1/4/2005 
205-552 
Christiana Bank & Trust as owner trustee of The Security 
National Funding Trust and Contimortgage Corporation 2039 N. 62nd Street 1 4 0 19151 1/4/2005 
205-565 Prime Funding inc. 
604 Washington 
Square Apt 1309 0  0 19106 1/4/2005 
205-577 Citifinancial Mortgage Co 5626 Crowson Street 1 6 0 19144 1/4/2005 
205-583 BOE LLC an Alaska Limitied Liability Co. 7805 Temple Road 0 0 1 19150 1/4/2005 
205-592 
LaSalle National Bank as trustee for the cert holders of 
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates 
497 East Sanger 
Street 1 17 0 19120 1/4/2005 
205-607 
Wells Fargo Bank as Trustee for Option One Mortgage 
Loan Trust 
6339 West Girard 
Avenue 1 6 0 19151 1/4/2005 
205-614 
Chase Manhattan Bank as trustee for Equity One ABS, 
Inc. Mortgage 419 Magee Avenue 0  1 19111 1/4/2005 
205-630 Philadelphia Neighborhood Housing Services 
5737 North Park 
Avenue 0  1 19141 1/4/2005 
205-639 Household Bank, FSB 
6572 Cobbs Creek 
Parkway 1 12 0 19142 1/4/2005 
205-645 National City Home Loan Services 
2629 South 66th 
Street 0  0 19142 1/4/2005 
205-654 Washintgton Mutual Bank S/b/m to Washington Home 2246 East Monmouth 1 2 0 19134 1/4/2005 
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Loans Street 
205-663 Deutsche Bank Trustee 2835 Solly Avenue 0  0 19152 1/4/2005 
205-675 Wells Fargo Bank Delta Funding Home Equity Loan 
1709 North Bambrey 
Street 1 4 0 19121 1/4/2005 
205-694 National Loan Investors 
5306-08 Haverford 
Avenue 0  0 19139 1/4/2005 
205-709 HSBC Bank as trustee for Ace Securities Corp 9227 Wesleyan Road 0  0 19114 1/4/2005 
205-714 Household Finance Consumer Discount Company 
1626 North 62nd 
Street 1 1 0 19151 1/4/2005 
205-723 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 
1662 Cheltenham 
Avenue 0  0 19124 1/4/2005 
205-732 New Century Mortgage Corp 6427 Upland Street 0  0 19142 1/4/2005 
205-746 Key Bank USA 4935 N. Uber Street 1 7 0 19141 1/4/2005 
205-756 GMAC Mortgage Corporation 
5212 Roosevelt 
Boulevard 0  0 19124 1/4/2005 
205-763 Advance Bank 1828 Sigel Street 1 9 0 19145 1/4/2005 
205-775 Alliance Mortgage Company 7208 Erdrick Street 0  1 19111 1/4/2005 
205-782 First Union National Bank of North Carolina 
3803 North Marshall 
Street 1 20 1 19140 1/4/2005 
205-793 
Mortgage Electonic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee 
for Wells Fargo Home Mortgage 
1625 South 56th 
Street  0  0 19143 1/4/2005 
205-806 Wachovia Bank 
554 East Tulpehocken 
Street 1 14 0 19144 1/4/2005 
205-817 
Washington Mutual Bank successor of interest to PNC 
Mortgage Corp of America 2308 Sepviva Street     19125 1/4/2005 
205-822 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 
405 West Stafford 
Street 0  0 19144 1/4/2005 
205-835 Bank One 
7303 North 21st 
Street 1 12 0 19138 1/4/2005 
205-848 Bank of Oklahoma 4015 Ormond Street 1 16 0 19124 1/4/2005 
205-853 The Bank of New York as trustee for EQCC Trust 7415 Georgian Road 0  1 19138 1/4/2005 
205-861 Wells Fargo Bank 4212 Sheffield Street 1 1 0 19136 1/4/2005 
205-877 Midfirst Bank 6727 Dorel Street 1 2 0 19142 1/4/2005 
205-888 Mortgage Electronic Systems Registration Inc.  1723 Johnston Street 0  1 19145 1/4/2005 
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205-900 Wachovia Bank 3510 North Lee Street 1 5 1 0 19134 1/4/2005 
205-906 Deutsche Bank Trustee of Ameriquest Mortgage 2243 Wakeling Street 0  0 19137 1/4/2005 
205-912 Cendant Mortgage Corporation 5854 Marshall Street 0  0 19144 1/4/2005 
205-929 National Mortgage Warehouse 3030 Princeton Street 1 4 0 19149 1/4/2005 
205-936 First Penn Bank  fka Transnational Mortgage Corp 
5235 Chancellor 
Street 0  0 19139 1/4/2005 
206-1010 Mortgage Registration Systems, Inc. 
6540 North Uber 
Street 1 3 0 19136 2/8/2005 
206-1018 Philadelphia Commercial Development Corp 1301 North 2nd Street     19122 2/8/2005 
206-306 American General Consumer Discount Company 5027 Parrish Street 1 9 0 19139 2/8/2005 
206-312 Mortgage Electronic Systems Registration Inc. 
1704 West Dounton 
Street 0  0 19140 2/8/2005 
206-327 Midfirst Bank 954 Wagner Street 0  0 19141 2/8/2005 
206-338 Cendant Mortgage Corporation 
534 West Somerville 
Avenue 0  0 19120 2/8/2005 
206-347 
Citifinancial Mortgage Company Inc. f/k/a Associates 
Consumer Discount Company 
5148 Wyalusing 
Avenue 0  0 19131 2/8/2005 
206-358 Citifinancial Mortgage Company inc f/k/a Ford CDC 1940 Plymouth Street 1 1 0 19138 2/8/2005 
206-361 ABM Amro Mortgage Group, Inc. 
5912 North 11th 
Street 0  0 19141 2/8/2005 
206-374 Mortgage Electronic Systems Registration Inc. 1129 Windrim Avenue 0  0 19141 2/8/2005 
206-388 
First Union National Bank Trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 
167 East Walnut Park 
Drive  0  0 19126 2/8/2005 
206-396 The Bank of New York as trustee for EQCC Trust 
6036-38 Larchwood 
Avenue   1 25 1 0 19143 2/8/2005 
206-405 
National City Home Loan Services assignee of Frist 
Financial Corporation 6513 Vine Street 1 2 0 19139 2/8/2005 
206-416 JP Morgan Chase Bank as trustee 5844 Trinity Street 1 12 0 19143 2/8/2005 
206-422 GMAC Mortgage Corporation 5316 Cedar Avenue 0  0 19143 2/8/2005 
206-440 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 12304 Rambler Road 0 1 1 19154 2/8/2005 
206-445 
Citifinancial Mortgage Co. Inc. fka Ford Consumer 
Discount Corp 7214 Rutland Street  1  0 19149 2/8/2005 
206-454 U.S. Mortgage 
14 North Salford 
Street 1 2 0 19139 2/8/2005 
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206-467 Mortgage Electronic Systems Registration Inc. 7030 Forrest Avenue 1 4 0 19138 2/8/2005 
206-473 Mortgage Electronic Systems Registration Inc. 4701 Penn Street 0  1 19124 2/8/2005 
206-488 
Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota N.A. s/b/m to Norwest Bank 
as trustee of Saloman brothers Mortgage Securities Inc. 
1514 South 58th 
Street 0  0 19143 2/8/2005 
206-492 
U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for EDCC 
Home Equity Loan Trust 
1500 Green Street 
Unit 3     19130 2/8/2005 
206-502 Mortgage Electronic Systems Registration Inc. 2910 Cedar Street 1 0 0 19134 2/8/2005 
206-518 Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company 1956 Ashley Street 0  1 19138 2/8/2005 
206-523 Mortgage Electronic Systems Registration Inc. 5622 Sprague Street 1 3 1 0 19138 2/8/2005 
206-532 
Washington Mutual Bank f/k/a PNC Mortgage Corp of 
America 
605 East Willard 
Street 1 1 0 19134 2/8/2005 
206-546 Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. 3518 Bleigh Street 1 8 0 19136 2/8/2005 
206-560 Wachovia Bank 1407 Alcott Street 0  0 19149 2/8/2005 
206-563 Deutsche Bank National Trust Company  
1835 East Venango 
Street 0  0 19134 2/8/2005 
206-575 Household Consumer Finance Discount Company 
1624 South Carlisle 
Street     19145 2/8/2005 
206-588 Mortgage Electronic Systems Registration Inc. 
2072 East Birch 
Street  1 3 0 19134 2/8/2005 
206-593 
Bank One as trustee for holders of ACE securities corp, 
Home Equity Loan Trust 7172 Montague Street 1 7 0 19135 2/8/2005 
206-608 Bank One, National Association, as trustee 
423 North Redfield 
Street 1 1 0 19151 2/8/2005 
206-612 Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota N.A. as trustee 
1226 North 60th 
Street     19151 2/8/2005 
206-626 Mortgage Electronic Systems Registration Inc. 8224 Buist Avenue 0  1 19153 2/8/2005 
206-640 First Union National Bank 1917 Haworth Street 1 8 1 19124 2/8/2005 
206-645 Mortgage Electronic Systems Registration Inc. 
2046 South 65th 
Street 1 2 0 19142 2/8/2005 
206-656 
LaSalle National Bank as trustee for cert holders of EMC 
Loan Trust 2628 S. Fairhill Street 1 0 0 19148 2/8/2005 
206-668 EMC Mortgage Corporation 
948 South Front 
Street 0  0 19147 2/8/2005 
206-675 Wachovia Bank 138 North Salford 0  0 19139 2/8/2005 
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Street 
206-687 
Norwest Bank as trustee of Salomon Brothers Mortgage 
Securities 622 McKean Street     19148 1/4/2005 
206-690 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 
4149 Hellerman 
Street 0  0 19135 2/8/2005 
206-696 
BA Mortgage LLP s/b/m to Nationsbanc Mortgage 
Corportation 7256 Mansfield Street 0  1 19138 2/8/2005 
206-708 National City Home Loan Services, Inc. 
5347 Lindbergh 
Boulevard 1 2 0 19143 2/8/2005 
206-716 Fleet Mortgage Corp 
2622 South Shields 
Street     19142 2/8/2005 
206-727 
U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for EDCC 
Home Equity Loan Trust 5237 Clarkson Street 1 8 0 19144 2/8/2005 
206-732 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 
2038 South Cleveland 
Avenue 1 1 0 19145 2/8/2005 
206-744 The CIT Group/Consumer Finance Inc. 
5240 North 
Syndenham Street 0  0 19141 2/8/2005 
206-758 Cenlar FSB 
1726 South 65th 
Street 1 0 0 19142 2/8/2005 
206-768 The Bank of New York as trustee  
101 Cobbs Creek 
Parkway 0  1 19139 2/8/2005 
206-779 Chase Manhatten Bank as trustee for Imc Home Equity 68 Manheim Street 1 2 0 19144 2/8/2005 
206-788 
Mortgage Access Corporation D/B/A Weichert Financial 
Services 
7236 Elmwood 
Avenue 0  0 19142 2/8/2005 
206-792 Bank One as Custodian/Trust 3114 Custer Street 1 1 0 19134 2/8/2005 
206-804 
Champion Mortgage, a division of Keybank USA, National 
Association, successor to the interests of Mortgage Co. 
Inc 7035 Ardeligh Street 0  0 19119 2/8/2005 
206-819 
The Bank of New York as trustee for EQCC Assest 
Backed Certificates 
5229 West Clarkson 
Avenue 1 1 0 19103 2/8/2005 
206-822 Select Portfolio Servicing Inc f/k/a Fairbanks Capital Corp  
6027 Springfield 
Avenue 1 8 0 19142 2/8/2005 
206-831 
Mortgage Electronic Systems Registration Inc. as nominee 
for Wachovia Mortgage Corporation 972 Carver Street 1 1 1 0 19111 2/8/2005 
206-849 Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. f/k/a Norwest Mortgage 2104 South 67th 0  0 19142 2/8/2005 
 75 
Inc. Street 
206-855 GMAC Mortgage Corporation of PA 
725 Wynnewood 
Road 0  0 19151 2/8/2005 
206-863 Washington Mutual Bank 
2121 East Monmouth 
Street 1 4 0 19134 2/8/2005 
206-879 Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company 7838 Provident Street 1 1 0 19150 2/8/2005 
206-885 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 8607 Williams Avenue 0  0 19150 2/8/2005 
206-892 
Citifinancial Mortgage Company, Inc. f/k/a Associates 
Equity Services 
8422 Michener 
Avenue 0  1 19150 2/8/2005 
206-906 
First Union National Bank as trustee for PA Housing 
Finance Agency 5959 Upland Way 0  0 19131 2/8/2005 
206-919 
American Business Mortgage Services, Inc f/k/a New 
Jersey Mortgage and Investment Corp 
2037 South Newkirk 
Street 0  0 19145 2/8/2005 
206-922 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee of 
Ameriquest Mortgage 379 Avon Street 0  0 19116 2/8/2005 
206-933 Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company 1603 East Eyre Street 0  0 19125 2/8/2005 
206-943 
Chase Mortgage Company-West f/k/a Mellon Mortgage 
Company 4146 Barnett Street 1 17 0 19135 2/8/2005 
206-954 
Wells Fargo Bank Minnnesota as trustee for Cert holders 
of EMC Mortgage Loan Trust 
1345 East 
Rittenhouse Street 0  0 19138 2/8/2005 
206-966 Citibank, N.A. as trustee 
6205 Washington 
Avenue 1 2 0 19143 2/8/2005 
206-974 
Federal National Mortgage Association  assignee of 
Colonial Mortgage Service 2208 Fitzwater Street 0  0 19146 2/8/2005 
206-985 Columbia National, Inc.  5716 Filbert Street 0  0 19139 2/8/2005 
206-993 
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc. f/k/a Norwest Mortgage 
Inc. 
2922 North Ringgold 
Street 1 3 0 19132 2/8/2005 
207-308 
Wells Fargo Bank as Trustee for Option One Mortgage 
Loan Trust 5100 Reno Street 1 2 0 19139 3/1/2005 
207-316 U.S. Bank National Association  3628 Jasper Street 1 4 0 19134 3/1/2005 
207-329 Deutsche Bank National Trust Company  
940 East Locust 
Avenue     19138 3/1/2005 
207-333 
The Bank of New York as Trustee for First City Capital 
Home Equity Loan Trust 6429 Chew Avenue 1 1 0 19119 3/1/2005 
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207-349 
American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc.f/k/a Columbia 
National Inc. 6723 Leeds Street 0  0 19151 3/1/2005 
207-358 
First Union National Bank as trustee for PA Housing 
Finance Agency 1510 Lardner Street 0  0 19149 3/1/2005 
207-367 Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB 
1722 West Allegheny 
Avenue 1 4 0 19132 3/1/2005 
207-377 Midfirst Bank 
6705 Lebanon 
Avenue 1 5 0 19151 3/1/2005 
207-384 
Citifinancial Mortgage Co Inc. f/k/a Ford Consumer 
Discount Company 
102 E. Washington 
Avenue 1 7 0 19144 3/1/2005 
207-395 Midfirst Bank 1916 S. 20th Street 0  0 19145 3/1/2005 
207-410 
Wells Fargo Bank, Minnesota as trustee for Delta Funding 
Home Equity Loan Trust 
420 E. Allegheny 
Avenue 1 2 0 19134 3/1/2005 
207-418 The Bank of New York 8008 Cornelius Street 0  0 19150 3/1/2005 
207-427 Citifinancial Mortgage Co 
5050 Haverford 
Avenue 1 3 0 19139 3/1/2005 
207-439 Columbia National, Inc.  
6431 Palmetto 
Avenue 1 7 0 19111 3/1/2005 
207-443 Wells Fargo Bank 
4544 North Camac 
Street 1 1 0 19140 3/1/2005 
207-457 Monument Street Funding, LLC 
3241 North Marston 
Street 1 5 1 19129 3/1/2005 
207-463 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 3120 Tulip Street 0  0 19134 3/1/2005 
207-476 Wells Fargo Bank 4930 Hazel Avenue 0 0 1 19143 3/1/2005 
207-489 First Horizon Home Loan Corporation 1702 Wolf Street  1 17 0 19145 3/1/2005 
207-491 Midfirst Bank 1930 Moore Street 1 0 0 19145 3/1/2005 
207-508 Homeside Lending Inc. fka BancBoston Mortgage Corp 
180 East Fariston 
Drive     19120 3/1/2005 
207-519 Washington Mutual Bank 9958 Hardy Road 1 0 0 19115 3/1/2005 
207-527 
FV-1 Inc as sucessor to Nations Credit Financial Services 
Corporation 
5619 North 10th 
Street 0  0 19141 3/1/2005 
207-540 Midfirst Bank 5630 Pine Street     19143 3/1/2005 
207-549 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee for the 
registered holders of CDC Mortgage Captial Trust 
417 East George 
Street 0  0 19125 3/1/2005 
 77 
207-556 Midfirst Bank 
2639 South Bonaffon 
Street     19142 3/1/2005 
207-566 Bank of New York 4039 J Street 1 12 1 0 19142 3/1/2005 
207-579 Bank of America, N.A. 7528 Bingham Street 0  0 19111 3/1/2005 
207-585 PNC Bank, N.A. 3166 Reach Street 0  0 19134 3/1/2005 
207-591 LaSalle Bank as Trustee 3721 Pulaski Avenue 1 9 1 0 19140 3/1/2005 
207-604 LaSalle Bank as Trustee 
2530 N. Marston 
Street 0  0 19132 3/1/2005 
207-612 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 
5931 North 11th 
Street 0  0 19141 3/1/2005 
207-625 Wells Fargo Bank 4223 Levick Street 1 2 0 19135 3/1/2005 
207-669 
Cendant Mortgage Corporation f/k/a PHH US Mortgage 
Corporation 829 Atwood Road 1 0 0 19151 3/1/2005 
207-675 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 6139 Grays Avenue 0  0 19142 3/1/2005 
207-685 The Bank of New York 
363 East Chelten 
Avenue 1 0 0 19144 3/1/2005 
207-697 Homeside Lending Inc. 
7519 Brookhaven 
Road 1 0 0 19151 3/1/2005 
207-706 Wells Fargo Bank 
3632 North 22nd 
Street 0  0 19140 3/1/2005 
207-713 Beneficial Mortgage Corporation 
5200-8 West 
Montgomery Avenue     19131 3/1/2005 
207-726 Citibank, N.A. as trustee 
2146 North 32nd 
Street 1 7 0 19121 3/1/2005 
207-736 Rescomm Holdings No. , LLC 
1839 W. Champlost 
Street 1 7 0 19141 3/1/2005 
207-749 
U.S. Bank National Association  as trustee for EQCC 
Home Equity Loan 
1342 South Mole 
Street 1 0 0 19146 3/1/2005 
207-755 ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc. 
214 West 64th 
Avenue 0  0 19120 3/1/2005 
207-762 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 6524 Marsden Street 0  1 19135 3/1/2005 
207-777 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 
226 West Highland 
Avenue 0  0 19118 3/1/2005 
207-785 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 3308 North 18th 1 0 0 19140 3/1/2005 
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Street 
207-792 The Bank of New York as trustee ofr EQCC Trust  
301 East Bringhurst 
Street 1 2 0 19144 3/1/2005 
207-808 Washington Mutual Bank 
4530 Rising Sun 
Avenue 0  0 19140 3/1/2005 
207-813 Wells Fargo Bank 2206 Christian Street 0  0 19146 3/1/2005 
207-821 Wells Fargo Bank 
6315 Elmwood 
Avenue 0  0 19142 3/1/2005 
208-305 Interim Capital, LLC successor in interest to Prime Bank 
5510-18 North 2nd 
Street     19120 4/5/2005 
208-319 Equity One, Inc. 6519 Paschall Street 1 0 0 19142 4/5/2005 
208-327 Principal Residential Mortgage, Inc. 5702 Virginian Road 0  0 19141 4/5/2005 
208-338 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 2226 Memphis Street 0  1 19125 4/5/2005 
208-347 Citimortgage Inc. d/b/a Citicorp Mortgage Inc. 
1510 East Haines 
Street 0  0 19126 4/5/2005 
208-354 Police and Fire Federal Credit Union 2649 Mayfield Street 0  0 19134 4/5/2005 
208-362 ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc. 8720 Cottage Street 0  1 19136 4/5/2005 
208-375 Wells Fargo Bank 
2522 North Patton 
Street 1 7 0 19132 4/5/2005 
208-381 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 609 Laramie Place 0  1 19115 4/5/2005 
208-393 Washington Mutual Bank 111 Linton Street  0  0 19120 4/5/2005 
208-406 Nationscredit Financial Services Corporation 
1625 East 
Washington Lane  1  0 19138 4/5/2005 
208-413 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 
5412 Lansdowne 
Avenue  1 4 0 19151 4/5/2005 
208-425 The Bank of New York as trustee for EQCC Trust 
2155 North Marston 
Street 0  0 19103 4/5/2005 
208-436 
Bank One, National Association, as trustee for cert hldrs of 
Bear Stearns  
1419 South 52nd 
Street 1 0 0 19143 4/5/2005 
208-450 Wells Fargo 5237 Rorer Street  1 0 0 19120 4/5/2005 
208-458 BNC Mortgage, Inc , a Delaware Corporation 2136 Spencer Street 0  0 19138 4/5/2005 
208-467 
First Union National Bank Trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 
5638 N. Warnock 
Street 1 8 0 19141 4/5/2005 
208-478 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.  3716 N. 7th Street 1 3 0 19140 4/5/2005 
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208-484 Bankers Trust Company, as trustee and custodian 
165 West Harvey 
Street 1 5 0 19144 4/5/2005 
208-494 
National City Mortgage Co. d/b/a Eastern Mortgage 
Services 6721 Ditman Street 0  0 19135 4/5/2005 
208-507 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. nominee 
for Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 7126 Edmund Street 1 0 0 19135 4/5/2005 
208-515 Columbia National, Inc.  584 East Alcott Street 1 0 0 19120 4/5/2005 
208-524 Citifinancial Mortgage Co 
820 Wynnewood 
Road 1 2 0 19151 4/5/2005 
208-532 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 1232 Crease Street 0  1 19125 4/5/2005 
208-546 
Deutche Bank Trust Company as Trustee for Long Beach 
Mortgage Loan Trust 6341 McCallum Street     19144 4/5/2005 
208-560 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 4413 Hedge Street 1 2 0 19124 4/5/2005 
208-565 Citifinancial Mortgage Co 
2346 North Park 
Avenue 1 0 0 19119 4/5/2005 
208-573 
Citifinancial Mortgage Co. Inc. fka Home Equity Consumer 
Discount Company 5701 Malcom Street 0  0 19143 4/5/2005 
208-585 New Century Home Equity Loan Trust  
2631 South Lloyd 
Street 0  0 19153 4/5/2005 
208-596 Ameriquest Mortgage Company 
2672 Winchester 
Avenue 0  0 19152 4/5/2005 
208-606 Wells Fargo Bank  1537 Ruan Street 1 1 
1 NOT YET 
SOLD 19124 4/5/2005 
208-611 PSA Financial Corp c/o First Penn Bank 
1443 South Broad 
Street 0  0 19147 4/5/2005 
208-628 Midfirst Bank 5815 Akron Street 0  0 19149 4/5/2005 
208-636 Franklin Credit Management Corp 5538 Upland Street 0  0 19143 4/5/2005 
208-647 
JP Morgan Chase Bank as trustee for GSRPM Mortgage 
Loan Trust 5733 Chester Avenue 0  0 19143 4/5/2005 
208-655 
Wachovia Bank as Trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 3459 Keim Street 1 4 0 19134 4/5/2005 
208-666 Conseco Finance Consumer Discount Company 5932 Nassau Street 0  0 19151 4/5/2005 
208-675 Mortgage Electronic Registration Services 5416 Locust Street 1 3 0 19139 4/5/2005 
208-681 Mortgage Electronic Registration Services 2060 East Venango 1 1 0 19134 4/5/2005 
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Street 
208-698 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 851 North Palm Street 1 1 0 19104 4/5/2005 
208-703 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 
2558 South Robinson 
Street 1 8 0 19142 4/5/2005 
208-714 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 7028 Vandike Street 0  0 19104 4/5/2005 
208-727 Gmac Mortgage Corporation 5849 Pentridge Street 1 3 0 19143 4/5/2005 
208-738 
JP Morgan Chase Bank as trustee in trust for the holders 
of Truman Mortgage Loan Trust 8047 Temple Street 1 1 0 19150 4/5/2005 
208-749 Bankers Trust Company of California  
4243 North Hicks 
Street 1 16 0 19140 4/5/2005 
208-751 Citizens Bank of PA 4924 North 7th Street 1 1 0 19120 4/5/2005 
208-766 
UCFC Loan Trust and Banker Trust Company of California 
as trustee 5346 Turner Street 1 2 0 19131 4/5/2005 
208-777 
Wells Fargo Bank astrustee for registered holders of 
Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates 1439 S. Allison Street 0  0 19143 4/5/2005 
208-788 Logan Consumer Discount Co. 1039 S. 52nd Street 1 0 0 19143 4/5/2005 
208-792 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 449 E. Cambria Street 1 9 0 19134 4/5/2005 
208-807 
U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for SASCO 
Aames Mortgage Loan Trust 5028 Catherine Street     19143 4/5/2005 
208-814 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 5149 N. Camac Street 1 0 0 19141 4/5/2005 
208-828 Mortgage Electonic Registration Systems Inc. 8347 Temple Road  0  0 19150 4/5/2005 
208-839 SFJV-2003-1, LLC 
253 West Sheldon 
Street 0 2 0 19120 4/5/2005 
208-842 SFJV-2003-1, LLC 
6714 Woodland 
Avenue 0  0 19142 4/5/2005 
208-856 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 2630  Sylmar Street 1 1 1 0 19142 4/5/2005 
208-863 Wachovia Bank of Delaware 6720 Limekiln Road 1 7 0 19138 4/5/2005 
208-876 Washington Mutual Bank s/b/m to Bank United 
93 West Sparks 
Street 1 6 0 19120 4/5/2005 
208-882 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee of 
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities 
726 W. Chelten 
Avenue     19126 4/5/2005 
208-894 Bank One National Association as Trustee  1007 Marlyn Road 0  0 19151 4/5/2005 
208-909 Alliance Mortgage Company 2424 S. Camac Street 0  0 19148 4/5/2005 
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208-915 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 6028 Webster Street 0  0 19143 4/5/2005 
208-928 FT Mortgage Companies 2624 S. 70th Street 0  0 19142 4/5/2005 
208-935 
The Bank of New York, Acting Solely in its Capacity 
asTrustee for EQCC Trust 
7026 Woodland 
Avenue  1 7 1 0 19142 4/5/2005 
208-944 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 
138 West Godfrey 
Avenue 1 13 0 19120 4/5/2005 
208-952 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 
364 West Duval 
Street 0  0 19144 4/5/2005 
208-969 
Wachovia Bank National Association as Trustee of the 
Security National Remic 1917 Catherine Street     19146 4/5/2005 
208-972 Citizens Bank of PA 583 Martin Street 0  1 19128 4/5/2005 
209-301 
Wachovia Bank as Trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 6918 Ogontz Avenue 1 9 0 19138 5/3/2005 
209-318 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc 526 E. Walnut Lane 1 4 1 0 19144 5/3/2005 
209-330 
MERS as nominee for Alaska Seaboard Partners Limited 
Partnership 6227 Reedland Street 0  0 19142 5/3/2005 
209-338 Washington Mutual Bank 
467 W. School House 
Lane 1 6 0 19144 5/3/2005 
209-342 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc. 4156 I Street 0  0 19124 5/3/2005 
209-356 
Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc. c/o 
Countrywide Home Loans 714 W. Nedro Avenue 0  0 19120 5/3/2005 
209-368 National City Mortgage Co. f/k/a Integra Mortgage o. 1332 Gilham Street 0  1 19111 5/3/2005 
209-376 Chase Manhattan Bank as Trustee 2453 S. Millick Street 1 1 0 19142 5/3/2005 
209-382 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 
2220 South 
Woodstock Street 1 0 0 19145 5/3/2005 
209-396 World Savings Bank FSB 
2071 E. Kingston 
Street 0  0 19134 5/3/2005 
209-402 Citicorp Trust Bank FSB f/k/a Travelers Bank and Trust 148 N. 54th Street 0  0 19139 5/3/2005 
209-414 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc 7239 N. 20th Street 1 1 0 19138 5/3/2005 
209-435 Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. 7236 Gillespie Street 0  0 19135 5/3/2005 
209-448 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, trustee on behalf 
of Morgan Stanley ABS Capital 511 Christian Street 0  1 19147 5/3/2005 
209-487 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 1832 Hoffman Street 1 0 0 19145 5/3/2005 
209-488 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 7166 Andrews 1 3 0 19138 5/3/2005 
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Avenue 
209-489 Republic First Bank 122 S. 43rd Street 0  0 19104 5/3/2005 
209-490 EMC Mortgage Corporation 
3025 N. Marshall 
Street 0  0 19133 5/3/2005 
209-491 Midfirst Bank 6034 Keystone Street 0  1 19135 5/3/2005 
209-505 Equicredit Corp of America 1830 Penfield Street 1 18 0 19126 5/3/2005 
209-529 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc 
1800 N. Howard 
Street 0  0 19122 5/3/2005 
209-536 Richard B. Hoffman 
2231-43 E. Ontario 
Street 0  0 19134 5/3/2005 
209-549 National City Mortgage Company 5105 Erdrick Street 0  0 19124 5/3/2005 
209-558 Fox Chase Bank 8032 Terry Street 1 0 1 19136 5/3/2005 
209-568 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. 
6629 Lansdownde 
Avenue 0  0 19151 5/3/2005 
209-574 Associates Financial Services Company, Inc. 
4213 East Roosevelt 
Boulevard 1  0 19124 5/3/2005 
209-581 Wachovia Bank 
2653 S. Holbrook 
Street 1 7 0 19142 5/3/2005 
209-599 WM Specialty Mortgage 
2621 West Dauphin 
Street 1 0.5 0 19132 5/3/2005 
209-610 Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. 734 Winton Street 1 0 0 19148 5/3/2005 
209-619 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. C/O Aurora 
Loan Services 
5538 Cambridge 
Street 1 7 0 19131 5/3/2005 
209-622 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc 6358 McCallum Street     19144 5/3/2005 
209-639 U.S. Bank National Association 246 S. Hirst Street 0  1 19139 5/3/2005 
209-646 Columbia National, Inc.  2834 Willits Road 1 0 0 19136 5/3/2005 
209-652 Citifinancial Mortgage Co. Inc 
67 W. Sharpnack 
Street 0  0 19119 5/3/2005 
209-663 
First Union National Bank Trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 161 Rosemar Street 1 5 0 19120 5/3/2005 
209-668 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 559 E. Tabor Road 0  1 19120 5/3/2005 
209-674 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Services as nominee for 
Gateway Funding Diversified Mortgage  Services, L.P. 
249 W. Spencer 
Street 0  0 19120 5/3/2005 
209-691 Equicredit Corporation of PA 1422 E. Lycoming 0  1 19124 5/3/2005 
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209-703 Key Bank USA 5846 Angora Street 0  0 19143 5/3/2005 
209-717 
Wells Fargo Bank as trustee for Salomon Brothers 
Mortgage Securities 6700 Stenton Avenue 0  0 19119 5/3/2005 
209-730 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. 5712 Thomas Avenue 1 2 0 19143 5/3/2005 
209-758 Chase Manhattan Bank 2023 Martha Street 1 0 0 19125 5/3/2005 
209-759 
U.S. Bank National as trustee for EQCC Home Equity 
Loan Trust 1903 Plymouth Street 0  0 19131 5/3/2005 
209-764 ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc. 
427 East Mentor 
Street 0  1 19120 5/3/2005 
209-779 Option One Mortgage Corporation 
717 Cobbs Creek 
Parkway 1 3 1 0 19143 5/3/2005 
209-783 
LaSalle Bank National as Trustee for Certificate Holders of 
EMC Mortgage Loan Trust Series 
756 East Madison 
Street 0  0 19134 5/3/2005 
209-800 
Washington Mutual Bank sucessor in interest to Homeside 
Lending, Inc. 8440 Forrest Avenue 0  0 19150 5/3/2005 
209-805 
Bankers Trust Co. of CA as trustee for Mellon CRA 
Mortgage Loan Trust 4107 N. 9th Street 1 5 0 19140 5/3/2005 
209-820 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 230 Parker Drive 1 1 0 19128 5/3/2005 
209-822 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 5781 Dunlap Street 1 4 0 19131 5/3/2005 
209-833 Washington Mutual Bank 7550 Brockton Road 0  0 19151 5/3/2005 
209-848 The Bank of New York 6959 Forrest Avenue 0  0 19138 5/3/2005 
209-856 Midfirst Bank 
1023 E. Chelten 
Avenue     19124 5/3/2005 
209-876 
Christiana Bank & Trust as owner trustee of Security 
National Funding 1428 S. 31st Street 0  0 19146 5/3/2005 
209-882 PNC Bank, N.A. 
1720 Gillingham 
Street 0  0 19124 5/3/2005 
209-895 DLJ Mortgage Capital Inc. 845 North Uber Street 0  1 19130 5/3/2005 
210-302 National City Mortgage Company 1725 W 68th Avenue 0  0 19126 6/7/2005 
210-311 
First Union National Bank Trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 
159 E Duncannon 
Avenue 1 6 0 19120 6/7/2005 
210-329 Sovereign Bank 6116 Jackson Street 0  0 19135 6/7/2005 
210-334 Sovereign Bank 4401 Castor Avenue 1 3 0 19142 6/7/2005 
210-342 Ameriquest Mortgage Company 6336 McCallum Street     19144 6/7/2005 
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210-360 Key Bank USA, National Association 6303 N. 11th Street 0  0 19141 6/7/2005 
210-369 Police and Fire Federal Credit Union 6028 Carpenter Street 0  1 19143 6/7/2005 
210-374 
HFTA Consumer Discount Company f/k/a  Transamerica 
Financial Consumer Discount Company 
1215 East Sydney 
Street     19150 6/7/2005 
210-388 Deutsche Bank National Trust Company 
7600 Woodbine 
Avenue 0  1 19151 6/7/2005 
210-393 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 5374 Chew Avenue 0  0 19138 6/7/2005 
210-403  Novastar Mortgage Inc. 5617 Frontenac Street 1 1 0 19124 6/7/2005 
210-416 Household Finance Consumer Discount Company 1823 S. Mole Street 1 8 0 19145 6/7/2005 
210-427 
Norwest Bank as trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan 
Trust 2939 N. Taney Street 0  0 19132 6/7/2005 
210-433 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 6964 Ogontz Avenue 0  1 19138 6/7/2005 
210-446 Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization 1219 Levick Street 0  0 19111 6/7/2005 
210-451 Mortgage Registration Systems, Inc. 932 Ramona Avenue 1 0 0 19124 6/7/2005 
210-470 
Veterans Administration C/O Countrywide Home Loans 
Inc. 2726 S. 76th Street 0  1 19153 6/7/2005 
210-476 Bank One, National Association 7534 Beverly Road 0  1 19138 6/7/2005 
210-485 Wachovia Bank of Delaware 
5630 Beaumont 
Avenue 1 8 0 19143 6/7/2005 
210-497 Republic First Bank 
4819 North 13th 
Street 0  1 19141 6/7/2005 
210-509 Midfirst Bank 543 Carver Street 1 0 0 19120 6/7/2005 
210-514 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 6030 N. Water Street 0  0 19120 6/7/2005 
210-521 Bankers Trust Company 1314 S. Clarion Street 0  1 19147 6/7/2005 
210-537 Midfirst Bank 639 E. Wishart Street 0  1 19134 6/7/2005 
210-542 
Wells Fargo Bank as Trustee for Option One Mortgage 
Loan Trust 
307 W. Annsbury 
Street 0  1 19140 6/7/2005 
210-553 Matrix Financial Services Corporation 
727 W. Wingohocking 
Street 1 0 0 19140 6/7/2005 
210-567 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 5222 Westford Road 1 7 0 19120 6/7/2005 
210-579 Washington Mutual Bank 4804 Bingham Street 1 1 1 0 19120 6/7/2005 
210-588 
The Bank of New York acting Solely in its Capacity as 
Trustee for EQCC Trust 1723 N. 3rd Street 0  0 19122 6/7/2005 
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210-594 Bank United 6222 Trotter Street 1 12 0 19111 6/7/2005 
210-603 U.S. Bank National Association 
2550 South Carroll 
Street 1 9 0 19142 6/7/2005 
210-611 Wells Fargo Bank  5311 Hedge Street 1 3 0 19124 6/7/2005 
210-629 Fleet Mortgage Corp 
5638 Wyndale 
Avenue  0  0 19131 6/7/2005 
210-631 Washington Mutual Bank 
2620 South Robinson 
Street 0  0 19142 6/7/2005 
210-642 State Street Bank and Trust Company 5422 Westford Road 1 11 1 0 19140 6/7/2005 
210-660 
Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc. as 
Nominee for Gateway Funding Divirsified Mortgage 
Services 6709 Trinity Street 1 3 0 19142 6/7/2005 
210-673 Wells Fargo Bank 76 E. Walnut Lane 1 2 0 19144 6/7/2005 
210-689 SFJV-2002-1, LLC 5529 Mascher Street 1 0 0 19120 6/7/2005 
210-695 Deutsche Bank National Trust Company  941 N. 48th Street 1 6 0 19131 6/7/2005 
210-710 Long Beach Mortgage Company 
5110 Haverford 
Avenue 0  0 19139 6/7/2005 
210-714 Citibank, N.A. as trustee 6144 Nassau Road 0  0 19151 6/7/2005 
210-728 
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc. f/k/a Norwest Mortgage 
Inc. 
195 West Champlost 
Avenue 1 5 0 19120 6/7/2005 
210-731 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. as nominee 
for Gateway Funding Diversified Mortgages Services  2124 Medary Avenue 1 5 0 19138 6/7/2005 
210-743 
Chase Mortgage Company-West f/k/a Mellon Mortgage 
Company 101 Rennard Place 0  0 19116 6/7/2005 
210-752 Washington Mutual Bank 4741 Mercer Street 0  0 19137 6/7/2005 
211-304 First Financial Bank, FSB 7622 Gilbert Street 0  0 19150 6/7/2005 
211-317 Citimortgage Inc. d/b/a Citicorp Mortgage Inc. 6147 Pine Street 0  0 19143 6/7/2005 
211-321 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. 1002 N. 43rd Street 1 5 0 19104 6/7/2005 
211-338 Wells Fargo Bank 5833 Ellsworth Street 0  0 19143 6/7/2005 
211-349 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 6307 Elmhurst Street 0  0 19111 7/12/2005 
211-351 Citimortgage Inc. 5927 Christian Street 1 3 0 19143 7/12/2005 
211-366 Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company 5550 Willows Avenue 0  0 19143 7/12/2005 
211-373 EMC Mortgage Corporation 2144 W. Grange 0  0 19138 7/12/2005 
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Street 
211-381 Citimortgage, Inc. 
2712 East Country 
Club Road 0  0 19131 7/12/2005 
211-394 Wells Fargo Bank s/b/m to Crossland Mortgage Company 4034 M Street  1 0 0 19124 7/12/2005 
211-409 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 3833 N. 8th Street 0  0 19140 7/12/2005 
211-413 Midfirst Bank 6941 Sprague Street 0  0 19119 7/12/2005 
211-426 Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. 6513 Wheeler Street 1 10 1 0 19142 7/12/2005 
211-432 Washington Mutual Bank 4718 Marple Street 1 0 0 19136 7/12/2005 
211-448 
Wachovia Bank as Trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 2923 N. 8th Street 1 2 0 19133 7/12/2005 
211-453 
Wells Fargo Bank National Association as trustee for First 
Franklin Loan Trust 
4830  N. Marshall 
Street 1 5 0 19120 7/12/2005 
211-462 Federal National Mortgage Association  7209 Pittville Avenue     19126 7/12/2005 
211-476 Bankers Trust Company of California  
2740 West Silver 
Street 1 3 0 19132 7/12/2005 
211-488 Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP 557  Comly Street 1 0 0 19101 7/12/2005 
211-494 Countrywide Home Loans Inc 7253 Souder Street 0  0 19149 7/12/2005 
211-503 Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota 622 Mountain Street 1 0 0 19148 7/12/2005 
211-514 Citifinancial Services Inc. 137 E. Johnson Street 1 0 0 19144 7/12/2005 
211-524 Option One Mortgage Corporation 3146 Potter Street 1 2 0 19134 7/12/2005 
211-538 GMAC Mortgage Corporation 6743 Grovers Avenue 1 0 0 19142 7/12/2005 
211-549 
Wells Fargo Bank as trustee for Delta Funding Home 
Equity Loan Trust 2536 Holbrook Street 0  0 19142 7/12/2005 
211-555 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 4607 Sheffield Street 0  1 19136 7/12/2005 
211-564 Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB 4806 McKean Avenue     19144 7/12/2005 
211-575 Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota 6111 Jefferson Street 0  0 19151 7/12/2005 
211-584 Citifinancial Mortgage Co. Inc 319 Shedaker Street 0  0 19144 7/12/2005 
211-596 Deutsche Bank National Trust Company 5312 Yocum Street 0  0 19143 7/12/2005 
211-604 U.S. Bank National Association 
3617 Spring Garden 
Street 0  0 19104 7/12/2005 
211-618 Bankers Trust Company of California  726 Wharton Street 0  0 19147 7/12/2005 
211-627 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc. 
1834 West Albanus 
Street 0  0 19141 7/12/2005 
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211-639 Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. 4119 K Street 1 1 0 19124 7/12/2005 
211-642 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc. 4442 N. 16th Street 1 9 0 19140 7/12/2005 
211-653 
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company as indenture 
trustee for soundview home equity loan trust 2243 N. 30th Street 0  0 19132 7/12/2005 
211-664 First Horizon Home Loan Corporation 6739 Dorel Street 0  0 19142 7/12/2005 
211-675 First Bank National Association Trust 6738 N. 16th Street 0  0 19126 7/12/2005 
211-686 Washington Mutual Bank 
6644 Greenway 
Street 1 7 0 19142 7/12/2005 
211-697 Wachovia Bank 2611 Amber Street 1 1 0 19134 7/12/2005 
211-710 Key Bank USA 
2321 West Huntington 
Street     19132 7/12/2005 
211-716 GMAC Mortgage Corporation 
213 West Rockland 
Street 1 1 0 19120 7/12/2005 
211-722 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 3436 N. Front Street 0  1 19140 7/12/2005 
211-736 
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company as indenture 
trustee for Contimortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 7354 N. 19th Street 0  0 19126 7/12/2005 
211-745 Prime Funding Inc. 723 Ritner Street 0  0 19148 7/12/2005 
211-751 
JP Morgan Chase Bank as Trustee for Equity One ABS 
Inc. 
6005 Greenway 
Avenue 1 2 0 19142 7/12/2005 
211-767 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 
5815 Thompson 
Street 1 8 0 19131 7/12/2005 
211-779 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 5952 N. 19th Street 1 5 0 19141 7/12/2005 
211-784 U.S. Bank National Association trustee 404 W. Queen Lane 0  0 19144 7/12/2005 
211-793 U.S. Bank National Association 38 S. 62nd Street 1 3 0 19139 7/12/2005 
211-804 
Bank of America, N.A. assignee of fidelity home mortgage 
corp. 
6044 N. American 
Street 0  0 19120 7/12/2005 
211-812 Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB 5847 Hadfield Street 0  0 19143 7/12/2005 
211-826 
Cendant Mortgage Corporation d/b/a Centurt 21 Mortgage 
Corporation 5158 Leiper Street 0  0 19124 7/12/2005 
211-832 Bank of America 3436 Mercer Street 0  1 19134 7/12/2005 
211-849 FT Mortgage Companies d/b/a MNC Mortgage 
520 W. Somerville 
Avenue 1 2 0 19120 7/12/2005 
211-854 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 7317 Sommers Road 0  0 19138 7/12/2005 
 88 
211-867 T.C.I.F. LLC 6548 N. 17th Street 1 5 0 19126 7/12/2005 
211-873 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 2550 S. Reese Street 0  0 19148 7/12/2005 
212-307 
Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota as trustee for Ocwen 
Mortgage Loan 
1257 S. Newkirk 
Street 0  1 19146 8/2/2005 
212-320 Midfirst Bank 
6609 Cormorant 
Place 1 6 0 19142 8/2/2005 
212-324 National City Mortgage Co. d/b/a Accubanc Mortgage 6649 Leeds Street 1 8 0 19151 8/2/2005 
212-339  Midfirst Bank 149 N. 57th Street 0  0 19139 8/2/2005 
212-344 Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota 6328 Reedland Street 1 1 0 19142 8/2/2005 
212-356 Mortgage Electronic Registration Services Inc. 5445 Delancy Street 0  0 19143 8/2/2005 
212-364 Sovereign Bank 5921 Reach Street 0  0 19120 8/2/2005 
212-378 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 5149 Saul Street 1 7 0 19124 8/2/2005 
212-390 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
5917 Baltimore 
Avenue 0  0 19143 8/2/2005 
212-391 Centex Home Equity Company LLC 6308 Vine Street 0  0 19139 8/2/2005 
212-406 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 6425 N. Camac Street 0  0 19126 8/2/2005 
212-418 GMAC Mortgage Corporation 6718 Chew Avenue 1 9 0 19119 8/2/2005 
212-423 U.S. Bank National Association 17 N. Robinson Street 1 1 0 19139 8/2/2005 
212-439 PNC Bank, N.A. 6033 Delancey Street 1 7 0 19143 8/2/2005 
212-450 
Wachovia Bank as Trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 1906 Elston Street 0  0 19138 8/2/2005 
212-455 Deutsche Bank 
521 E. Clarkson 
Avenue 0  0 19120 8/2/2005 
212-470 Countrywide Home Loans 1152 Tabor Plaza 0  0 19111 8/2/2005 
212-476 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc. 2810 Memphis Street 0  1 19134 8/2/2005 
212-487 Novastar Mortgage Inc. 41 W. Harvey Street 0  1 19144 8/2/2005 
212-492 Columbia National, Inc.  4845 A Street 1 1 0 19120 8/2/2005 
212-504 Citifinancial Mortgage Company 3026 N. 25th Street 0  0 19132 8/2/2005 
212-518 SFJV-2004-1, LLC 1353 Fillmore Street 1 0 0 19124 8/2/2005 
212-524 Washington Mutual Home Loans Inc. 916 Edgemore Road 1 0 0 19151 8/2/2005 
212-532 
Harris Trust and Savings Bank, as trustee by its attorney 
in fact Ocwen Federal Bank 7905 Caesar Place 0  0 19153 8/2/2005 
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212-547 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 6303 Algon Avenue 1 0 0 19111 8/2/2005 
212-555 Raymond Biddle 2125 S. 15th Street 1 0 0 19145 8/2/2005 
212-563 The CIT Group/Consumer Finance Inc. 1935 Dennie Street 1 9 0 19140 8/2/2005 
212-572 Wachovia Bank 
1712 West Girard 
Avenue 0  0 19130 8/2/2005 
212-587 Wachovia Bank of Delaware 7115 State Road  0  0 19135 8/2/2005 
212-591 Citibank, N.A. as trustee 
7019 Woolston 
Avenue 1 1 0 19138 8/2/2005 
212-608 Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corporation 2440 W. 79th Avenue 1 0 0 19150 8/2/2005 
212-615 PNC Bank, N.A. 
1543 N. Bouvier 
Street 0  1 19121 8/2/2005 
212-630 US Bank National Association 6325 McCallum Street     19144 8/2/2005 
212-639 Nationscredit Financial Services Corporation 
558 E. Woodlawn 
Street 1 7 0 19144 8/2/2005 
212-649 Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization 6533 Windsor Avenue 1 0 0 19142 8/2/2005 
212-655 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 
5744 North Marvine 
Street 1 9 0 19141 8/2/2005 
212-664 Archer WG1, LLC 1625 S. 56th Street 0  0 19143 8/2/2005 
212-680 Cendant Mortgage Corporation 4037 Dungan Street 1 14 0 19124 8/2/2005 
212-687 Washington Mutual Bank 5422 Norfolk Street 1 4 0 19143 8/2/2005 
212-695 Able Funding LLP 4308 N. 8th Street 1 1 0 19140 8/2/2005 
212-705 Citibank, N.A. as trustee 2112 Orthodox Street 0  0 19124 8/2/2005 
212-712 Bank One National Association as Trustee  956 E. Godfrey Street 1 0 0 19124 8/2/2005 
212-728 The Bank of New York trustee for EQCC Trust 2215 Mifflin Street 0 0 0 19145 8/2/2005 
212-732 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 
2405 South Frazier 
Street 0  0 19143 8/2/2005 
212-749 
Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota as trustee for Option One 
Mortgage Loan Trust 3034 Agate Street 1 4 0 19134 8/2/2005 
212-754 Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota 
2321 South Hicks 
Street 0  0 19145 8/2/2005 
212-766 
LaSalle Bank National Association as Trustee for 
Certificate Holders of Bear Stearns asset backed 
securities 
3118 N. Stillman 
Street 1 1 0 19132 8/2/2005 
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212-773 Deutsche Bank National Trust Company 5743 N. 13th Street 1 0 0 19141 8/2/2005 
212-787 PNC Bank, N.A. 4041 Green Street 1 0 0 19104 8/2/2005 
212-796 Wachovia Bank 5233 Roosevelt Blvd. 0  0 19124 8/2/2005 
212-808 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 170 W. Luray Street 1 8 1 0 19140 8/2/2005 
212-815 
BA Mortgage LLC (a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank of 
America) s/b/m to Nationsbanc Mortgage Corportation 
324 Devereaux 
Avenue 0  0 19111 8/2/2005 
213-302 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
210 E. Allegheny 
Avenue 1 2 0 19134 9/13/2005 
213-314 
Wachovia Bank NA as trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 439 Roselyn Street 1 9 0 19120 9/13/2005 
213-323 American General Consumer Discount Company 
1225 W. Wyoming 
Street 0  1 19140 9/13/2005 
213-332 Citimortgage Inc. 114 W. Queen Lane 0  0 19144 9/13/2005 
213-346 Wachovia Bank 243 W. Tioga Street 0  0 19140 9/13/2005 
213-352 
First Union National Bank as trustee for PA Housing 
Finance Agency 
6524 N. Woodstock 
Street 1 0 0 19138 9/13/2005 
213-367 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
666 E. Clementine 
Street 1 7 0 19134 9/13/2005 
213-379 GMAC Mortgage Corporation 
2138 Scattergood 
Street 0  1 19134 9/13/2005 
213-386 Jerome Whack 1805 Montrose Street 0  1 19126 9/13/2005 
213-391 Sovereign Bank 379 Martin Street 0  1 19128 9/13/2005 
213-403 
Wachovia Bank NA as trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 
1925 E. Monmouth 
Street 1 2 0 19134 9/13/2005 
213-708 PNC Bank , National Association Consumer loan Center 
4847 Gransback 
Street 0  1 19120 9/13/2005 
213-716 Citifinancial Mortgage Company, Inc. 
4602 Linmore 
Street/Avenue 1 2 0 19143 9/13/2005 
213-729 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 446 N. 52nd Street 1 6 1 0 19139 9/13/2005 
213-731 Port Richmond Savings 3179 Aramingo Ave 0  0 19134 9/13/2005 
213-746 
Wells Fargo Bank as trustee of Salomon Bros MTG 
Securities 1910 E. Harold Street 0  1 19135 9/13/2005 
213-754 WM Specialty Mortgage LLC 1705 Kinsey Street 0  0 19124 9/13/2005 
213-761 PNC Bank 1951 Bonitz Street 1 0 0 19140 9/13/2005 
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213-776 Chase Home Finance LLC 832 Magee Avenue 0  0 19111 9/13/2005 
213-783 Bankone National Association Trustee 
1915 W. Lehigh 
Avenue 0  0 19132 9/13/2005 
213-791 
Wells Fargo Bank as trustee for Delta Funding Home 
Equity Loan Trust 
3923-25 Ridge 
Avenue 0  1 19132 9/13/2005 
213-804 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 
1717 Nathaniel 
Drive/Place 0  1 19116 9/13/2005 
213-817 ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc. 5735 Leonard Street 1 1 0 19149 9/13/2005 
213-822 Citifinancial Mortgage Co. Inc 4931 B Street 0 0 0 19120 9/13/2005 
213-856 Bank of Oklahoma 6037 Edmund Street 0  1 19135 9/13/2005 
213-862 Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. 703 S. 17th Street 1 0 0 19146 9/13/2005 
213-880 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 8003 Buist Avenue 1 0 0 19153 9/13/2005 
213-881 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc as nominee 
for Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 9562A State Road 0  1 19114 9/13/2005 
214-306 
Wachovia Bank NA as trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 1947 Ashley Street 1 20 1 0 19138 10/4/2005 
214-317 Chase Home Finance LLC 2046 N. Gratz Street 1 0 0 19121 10/4/2005 
214-327 Cenlar, FSB 
43 W. Rockland 
Street 0  0 19144 10/4/2005 
214-333 Alliance Funding 
237 East Elkhart 
Street 1 4 0 19134 10/4/2005 
214-345 
Wachovia Bank, NA as trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 
2624 S. Daggett 
Street 0  0 19142 10/4/2005 
214-356 LaSalle National Bank 6143 Sansom Street 0  0 19139 10/4/2005 
214-370 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 125 N. Ruby Street 0  0 19139 10/4/2005 
214-374 Washington Mutual Bank 61 E. Hortter Street 1 0 0 19119 10/4/2005 
214-381 ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc. 
6416-20 Girard 
Avenue 0  1 19151 10/4/2005 
214-393 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. 2037 McClellan Street     19145 10/4/2005 
214-408 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc. 5203 Marlowe Street     19124 10/4/2005 
214-413 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc. 
2536 South 66th 
Street 1 18 1 0 19142 10/4/2005 
214-430 
JP Morgan Chase Bank as Trustee for Wilshire Credit 
Corporation 
2825 W. Clementine 
Street 0  0 19132 10/4/2005 
 92 
214-438 GMAC Mortgage Corporation 2743 N. Reese Street 0  1 19128 10/4/2005 
214-449 Citimortgage Inc. 591 Allengrove Street 0  0 19120 10/4/2005 
214-456 Bankers Trust Company of California  2760 Clayton Street 0  1 19152 10/4/2005 
214-463 Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. 7345 Ogontz Avene 0  0 19138 10/4/2005 
214-478 Aurora Loan Services, Inc. 
5803 Pemberton 
Street 1 3 0 19143 10/4/2005 
214-482 Homeamerican Credit Inc. 5134 Ogden Street 0 0 0 19139 10/4/2005 
214-493 Cendant Mortgage Corporation 227 E. High Street 1 0 0 19144 10/4/2005 
214-501 Mortgage Electronic Registration Services Inc. 3941 L Street 0  0 19124 10/4/2005 
214-517 Bankers Trust Company of California  1516 Wynsam Street 1 10 0 19138 10/4/2005 
214-529 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 2646 S. Felton Street 1 8 1 0 19142 10/4/2005 
214-533 Indymac Bank, F.S.B. 
3255 E. Thompson 
Street 0  0 19134 10/4/2005 
214-545 GE Capital Mortgage Services, Inc. 
9001 Ridge Avenue 
Unit 41      19128 10/4/2005 
214-554 
LaSalle National Bank as trustee for Salomon Brothers 
Mortgage Securities 
159 W. Wyneva 
Street 0  0 19144 10/4/2005 
214-563 US Bank National Association  
8321 23 Micheener 
Street     19150 10/4/2005 
214-576 
Wachovia Bank NA as trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 
1518 Devereaux 
Avenue 0  0 19149 10/4/2005 
214-590 
First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Bucks 
County 
4801 Ashburner 
Street     19136 10/4/2005 
214-593 Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc. 170 E. Duval Street 1 5 1 0 19144 10/4/2005 
214-603 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 
4914 N. Carlisle 
Street 1 5 0 19141 10/4/2005 
214-618 Nationsbanc Mortgage Corporation 2035 S. 22nd Street 1 2 0 19145 10/4/2005 
214-626 ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc. 3232 N. Bailey Street 1 7 1 0 19129 10/4/2005 
214-633   
2403 E. Clearfield 
Street 0  1 19134 10/4/2005 
214-649 
Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota as trustee for Merrill Lynch 
Mortgage Investors Loan Trust 2620 Tremont Street 1 3 1 0 19152 10/4/2005 
214-658 Fairbanks Capital Corp 5964 Trinity Street 1 1 0 19143 10/4/2005 
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214-664 PNC Bank 5267 N. 6th Street 0  0 19120 10/4/2005 
214-673 Centex Home Equity Company LLC 1913 E. Pike Street     19124 10/4/2005 
214-688 Fleet Mortgage Corp 8418 Temple Road     19150 10/4/2005 
214-692 Prime Funding Inc. 
39 S. Farragut 
Terrace 0  1 19139 10/4/2005 
214-709 
Wells Fargo Bank as trustee for Option One Mortgage 
Loan Trust 1834 S. 18th Street 0  0 19145 10/4/2005 
214-716 Countrywide Home Loans 910 Brill Street 1 0 0 19124 10/4/2005 
214-728 Household Finance Consumer Discount Company 
5230-5232 Morris 
Street 1 4 0 19144 10/4/2005 
214-734 Washington Mutual Bank 6902 Buist Avenue 1 19 1 0 19142 10/4/2005 
214-750 Option One Mortgage Corporation 
824 E. Cornwall 
Street 1 6 1 0 19134 10/4/2005 
214-751 Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc. 7203 Kindred Street 0 0 1 19149 10/4/2005 
214-768 
LaSalle Bank National Association as Trustee for 
Certificate Holders of Bear Stearns asset backed 
securities 2654 Shields Street 0  0 19142 10/4/2005 
214-772 Interbay Funding LLC, servicing agent for Wachovia Bank 304 E. Walnut Lane     19144 10/4/2005 
215-309 Wachovia Bank of Delaware 2128 Lambert Street 1 3 0 19121 11/1/2005 
215-315 
First Union National Bank as trustee for PA Housing 
Finance Agency 3929 Palmetto Stree 1 8 0 19124 11/1/2005 
215-327 Chase Manhattan Bank 
6330 Torresdale 
Avenue 1 0 0 19135 11/1/2005 
215-338 Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization 
232 Kenilworth 
Avenue 1 0 0 19120 11/1/2005 
215-349 Beal Bank, SSB 1842 McKean Street     19145 11/1/2005 
215-354 Indymac Bank, F.S.B. 2815 Ogden Street 1 0 0 19130 11/1/2005 
215-365 Wells Fargo Bank NA 1602 Godfrey Avenue 1 0 0 19141 11/1/2005 
215-376 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc. 4568 H Street 0  1 19124 11/1/2005 
215-390 U.S. Bank National Association 6238 Catharine Street 0  0 19143 11/1/2005 
215-397 
U.S. Bank as trustee for New Century Home Equity Loan 
Trust 5108 Duffield Street 0  0 19124 11/1/2005 
215-407 Household Finance Consumer Discount Company 2111 N. 29th Street 0  0 19121 11/1/2005 
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215-415 Chase Home Finance LLC 413 Friendship Street 1 7 1 0 19111 11/1/2005 
215-428 Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. 
1518 W. Nedro 
Avenue 0  0 19141 11/1/2005 
215-439 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 
1326 N. Hancock 
Street 0  0 19122 11/1/2005 
215-446 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 2062 Medary Avenue 1 6 1 0 19138 11/1/2005 
215-457 Property Assest Management, Inc. 6544 Chester Avenue 1 0 0 19142 11/1/2005 
215-465 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 1439 Higbee Street 0  0 19149 11/1/2005 
215-473 Archer WG1, LLC 846 E. Hilton Street 1 0 0 19134 11/1/2005 
215-482 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company as trustee of Saxon 
Mortgage Services 5032 Willows Avenue 1 0 0 19143 11/1/2005 
215-498 ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc. 5019 Keyser Street 1 0 0 19144 11/1/2005 
215-507 Countrywide Home Loan Servicing LP 207 N. 58th Street 1 3 0 19139 11/1/2005 
215-513 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 2312 78th Avenue 0  0 19150 11/1/2005 
215-529 
Wachovia Bank NA as trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 1506 Beverly Road 0  0 19138 11/1/2005 
215-538 Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc. 3501 Decatur Street 1 2 0 19135 11/1/2005 
215-542 Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc. 449 N. 65th Street 1 5 0 19151 11/1/2005 
215-552 
Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota as trustee Morgan Stanley 
Dean Witter 123 Lombard Street 1 0 0 19147 11/1/2005 
215-566 Chase Home Finance LLC 
2444 N. Douglas 
Street 1 2 0 19132 11/1/2005 
215-574 American Business Credit Inc. 424 S. 60th Street 1 10 0 19143 11/1/2005 
215-582 Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. 8561 Temple Road 1 0 0 19150 11/1/2005 
215-593 Centex Home Equity Corporation LLC 2005 N. 29th Street 0  1 19121 11/1/2005 
215-605 National City Mortgage Co. 6721 Ditman Street 0  0 19135 11/1/2005 
215-614 
Wachovia Bank NA as trustee for PA Housing Finance 
Agency 6263 N. 4th Street 0  1 19120 11/1/2005 
215-629 
U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for CSFB ABS 
Trust 
6641 Guyer 
Street/Avenue 1 3 0 19142 11/1/2005 
215-632 Federal National Mortgage Association  5228 N. 10th Street 0  1 19141 11/1/2005 
215-643 
Wells Fargo Bank National Association as trustee for First 
Union National Bank 5146 Hazel Avenue 0  1 19143 11/1/2005 
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215-709  Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 315 New Street     19106 11/1/2005 
215-715 EMC Mortgage Corporation 5807 N. 12th Street 0  0 19141 11/1/2005 
215-721 
National City Mortgage Company d/b/a Eastern Mortgage 
Services 1413 N. Gratz Street     19121 11/1/2005 
215-737 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems 
6020 West Columbia 
Avenue 1 4 1 0 19151 11/1/2005 
215-746 
Champion Mortgage, a division of Keybank USA, National 
Association, successor to the interests of Mortgage Co. 
Inc 1639 Orthodox Street 0  0 19124 11/1/2005 
215-760 Bank of America, National Association 6322 Oakland Street 0  0 19149 11/1/2005 
215-766 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc 7231 Grays Avenue 1 4 0 19142 11/1/2005 
215-779 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 
2226 South 
Beechwood Street 0  0 19145 11/1/2005 
215-787 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 871 N. 49th Street 1 0 0 19139 11/1/2005 
215-794 
Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota c/o Countrywide Home 
Loans 1034 S. Frazier Street 1 7 0 19143 11/1/2005 
215-805 
Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc. as 
nominee for Homeside lending 2107 S. 65th Street 0  1 19142 11/1/2005 
215-819 HSBC Bank as trustee for Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 
1601 Spring Garden 
Street     19130 11/1/2005 
215-828 Washington Mutual Bank, FA 1548 S. 26th Street 1 2 0 19146 11/1/2005 
215-835 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 2721 S. 13th Street 0  0 19148 11/1/2005 
215-847 Homeq Servicing Corporation d/b/a the Money Store 7941 Thouron Street 0  1 19150 11/1/2005 
215-857 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 2047 N Philip Street 1 0 0 19122 11/1/2005 
215-863 Bank of New York 
160 W. Wyneva 
Street  1 0 0 19144 11/1/2005 
215-876 The Chase Manhattan Bank 
522 E. Clarkson 
Avenue 0  0 19120 11/1/2005 
215-881 Nationscredit Financial Services Corporation 2027 S. Salford Street 1 7 0 19143 11/1/2005 
215-894 Washington Mutual Bank 4109 Welsh Road 0  0 19136 11/1/2005 
215-908 National city Mortgage Co. 
2217 S. Croskey 
Street 1 3 0 19145 11/1/2005 
215-914 Columbia National, Inc.  3703 A Willits Road     19114 11/1/2005 
216-305 Deutsche Bank National Trust Company 7202 Sommers Road 1 0 0 19138 12/6/2005 
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216-319 Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota 
1114 E. Durham 
Street 1 0 0 19150 12/6/2005 
216-324 GMAC Mortgage Corporation 
6532 Glenmore 
Avenue 1 0 0 19142 12/6/2005 
216-350 
Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota as trustee for Option One 
Mortgage Loan Trust 
13008 Worthington 
Road 0  1 19116 12/6/2005 
216-355 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systmes Inc. 8116 Williams Avenue 0  1 19150 12/6/2005 
216-361 
Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. as 
nominee for First Union Mortgage Corporation Inc. 2129 Kennedy Street 1 3 1 0 19124 12/6/2005 
216-380 Midfirst Bank 2717 Unruh Avenue 0  0 19149 12/6/2005 
216-382 Advance Bank 
4521 Baltimore 
Avenue 0  1 19143 12/6/2005 
216-391 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
1021 E. Cheltenham 
Avenue 1 0 0 19124 12/6/2005 
216-409 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 1700 Kennedy Street 0  0 19124 12/6/2005 
216-418 GMAC Mortgage Corporation 8643 Temple Road 0  0 19150 12/6/2005 
216-421 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 4115 Gypsy Lane 0  0 19129 12/6/2005 
216-437 Midfirst Bank 40 W. Pomona Street 0  1 19144 12/6/2005 
216-445 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 6332 Theodore Street 1 0 0 19142 12/6/2005 
216-453 Deutsche Bank National Trust Company 
6507 Torresdale 
Avenue 1 1 0 19135 12/6/2005 
216-469 Washington Savings Association 6125 Ditman Street 0  1 19135 12/6/2005 
216-472 
Wells Fargo Bank, N. as trustee for Option One Mortgage 
Loan Trust 4559 N. 16th Street 0  0 19140 12/6/2005 
216-487 
Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota as Trustee for Delta Funding 
Home Equity Loan 5149 Charles Street 1 7 0 19124 12/6/2005 
216-494 Manufactures and Traders Trust Company 
1305 W. Clearfield 
Street 0  0 19132 12/6/2005 
216-506 
U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for Structured 
Assests Security Corporation 7372 Wheeler Street 1 11 0 19153 12/6/2005 
216-520 Wachovia Bank 
510 W. Cornwall 
Street 1 0 1 0 19140 12/6/2005 
216-529 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.  558 Overlook Road 0  0 19128 12/6/2005 
216-534 Deutsche Bank Trust Company as trustee of Saxon 6243 Magnolia Street 0  1 19144 12/6/2005 
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Mortgage Services 
216-548 VNB Mortgage Services, Inc. 2047 S. 24th Street 1 0 0 19145 12/6/2005 
216-557 RBMG, Inc. 5312 Osage Avenue 0  0 19143 12/6/2005 
216-564 
Wachovia Bank National Association as trustee of the 
Securtiy National Mortgage Loan Trust 2026 Dreer Street 1 0 0 19125 12/6/2005 
216-572 Beneficial Consumer Discount Company 6421 Belfield Avenue 0  1 19119 12/6/2005 
216-583 PNC Bank, N.A. 5671 Arlington Street 1 0 0 19131 12/6/2005 
216-599 WM Specialty Mortgage LLC 2829 Welsh Road 0  0 19152 12/6/2005 
216-606 
Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota as Trustee for Delta Funding 
Home Equity Loan 
3339 N. Smedley 
Street 0  0 19140 12/6/2005 
216-618 Option One Mortgage Corporation 1510 S. Lindenwood 1 4 1 0 19143 12/6/2005 
216-625 
LaSalle Bank National Association as Trustee for 
Certificate Holders of EMC Mortgage Loan Trust Services 
2438 W. Nicholas 
Street 1 4 1 0 19121 12/6/2005 
216-634 SFJV-2003-1, LLC 
8012 Mansfield 
Avenue 0  0 19150 12/6/2005 
216-646 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as trustee of 
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities 544 W. Clapier Street 0  1 19144 12/6/2005 
216-660 Washington Mutual Bank, FA  2109 S. Shields Street 1 7 0 19142 12/6/2005 
216-665 Washington Mutual Bank 6237 Old York Road 0  0 19141 12/6/2005 
216-672 
LaSalle Bank National Association as Trustee for 
Certificate Holders of EMC Mortgage Loan Trust Services 5017 N. 10th Street 0  0 19141 12/6/2005 
216-689 GE Mortgage Services LLC Travelers Mortgage Services 
6207 Shelbourne 
Street 1 0 0 19111 12/6/2005 
216-696 
First Horizon Home Loan Corporation d/b/a MNC 
Mortgage 426 Fanshawe Street 1 0 0 19111 12/6/2005 
216-710 Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas 2745 Ash Street 0  0 19137 12/6/2005 
216-716 LaSalle National Bank 2006 Stenton Avenue 1 6 0 19138 12/6/2005 
216-729 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation 7028 Vandike Street 0  0 19135 12/6/2005 
216-732 Bank of America 6239 N. 12th Street 0  0 19141 12/6/2005 
216-745 Wells Fargo Bank 5735 N. 7th Street 1 6 0 19120 12/6/2005 
216-756 WM Specialty Mortgage LLC 4545 Sansom Street 0  0 19139 12/6/2005 
216-764 
U.S. Bank N.A. as Trustee for New Century Home Equity 
Loan Trust 907 McPherson Street    19150 12/6/2005 
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216-773 Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization 6530 N. 17th Street 1 0 0 19126 12/6/2005 
216-782 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. 
7643 Woodcrest 
Avenue 0  0 19151 12/6/2005 
216-800 Cendant Mortgage Corporation 
1121 Saint Vincent 
Street 0  0 19111 12/6/2005 
216-806 Hudson United Bank 5916 N. 7th Street 0  0 19120 12/6/2005 
216-819 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc. 1702 Stenton Avenue 1 7 0 19141 12/6/2005 
216-823 Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization 2954 E Street 1 9 0 19134 12/6/2005 
216-835 GE Capital Mortgage Services, Inc. 618 Marlyn Road 0  0 19151 12/6/2005 
216-850 
JP Morgan Chase Bank as trustee for certificate holders of 
Bearn Stearns Assets-Backed Certificates 120 N. Salford Street 1 2 0 19139 12/6/2005 
216-854 Citifinancial Mortgage Co. 1647 Annin Street 0  0 19146 12/6/2005 
216-862 
U.S. Bank National Association as trustee of CSFB ABS 
Trust Series 
8740 Torresdale 
Avenue 1 0 0 19136 12/6/2005 
216-873 Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems Inc. 7302 Sommers Road 1 0 0 19138 12/6/2005 
216-881 JP Morgan Chase as trustee for Euity One ABS, Inc. 
5200-02 Roosevelt 
Boulevard 1 7 0 19124 12/6/2005 
216-895 LaSalle Bank National Association 
5216 Beaumount 
Street 0  0 19143 12/6/2005 
216-902 
Bankone National Association Trustee for Residential 
Funding Corporation 2105 Bleigh Avenue 1 1 1 0 19152 12/6/2005 
216-916 Citizens Bank of PA 
4606 Weymouth 
Street 1 1 0 19120 12/6/2005 
409-423 
National City Mortgage Co. d/b/a Eastern Mortgage 
Services 4528 E. Howell Street 0  0 19135 5/3/2005 
607-638 GMAC Mortgage Corporation 3164 Agate Street 1 1 0 19134 3/1/2005 
607-649 Select Portfolio Servicing Inc f/k/a Fairbanks Capital Corp  62 East Logan Street  1 12 0 19144 3/1/2005 
607-653 Washington Mutual Bank 6101 N. Fairhill Street 1 0 0 19120 3/1/2005 
         
         
         
 
